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ABSTRACT
ENHANCED CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPROACHES
FOR SCADA NETWORK SECURITY
Waleed H. EISaid
07-02-2010
Due to the overwhelming increase in open source code, off-the-shelf software
packages, third party and vendor codes, along with the ease of getting information about
hacking network security systems and attacking the well known holes in security
systems, the problem of having a secure network system is much more difficult than
before this boom in technology and information broadcast. What makes the problem even
worse is trying to secure a network for real time control, such as a network using
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, because now the problem has
two faces: securing the real time control system and at the same time keeping the
response time of the system in the acceptable range for the transactions' level of service.
There is a strong trend to chose security frameworks that have been popular in the
e-commerce sites of the web, particularly because they proven to be very mature and
secure for more than one and half decades. Examples include the transport level security
(TLS) and its predecessor secured socket layer (SSL) framework that is based on the very
popular public key cryptography and key distribution algorithms, such as Rivest, Shamir
and Adleman (RSA), elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman.
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Despite the fact that these algorithms proved to be very powerful against most
types of attacks, they are not tailored to secure SCADA networks, and consequently
cause a significant degradation in the performance time of real time transactions.
This dissertation offers two novel encryption algorithms for securing a SCADA
network, the N-Secrecy and the Security Spectrum algorithms. N-Secrecy gave very good
results when compared with the SSL; with N-Secrecy performance time in the range of
one thousandth of the SSL. The Security Spectrum approach moved the encryption
methodology from using numerical representations into using a physical representation
based on modeling the conditions of the two communicating parties with a system of
non-linear polynomials and then using computer algebra techniques. Both approaches
have the potential to significantly enhance the security of commercial SCADA
installations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to present an introduction to the supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) network systems, and to the enhanced cryptographic
approaches for SCADA network security, which is the subject of this dissertation. The
introduction includes an overview of the usage of cryptography in securing SCADA
networks and the objective and organization of the whole dissertation.

1.1

Cryptography for securing SCADA networks

SCADA is broadly used in many industries that require real time control systems such as,
water management, traffic signals, electric power, oil pipelines, and manufacturing
systems. The most famous and commercially available cryptographic approach that is
adopted by many SCADA systems is the secured socket layer / transport level security
(SSUTLS) framework. Following is a brief discussion on what SSLlTLS is and what its
advantages and disadvantages are when used with SCADA systems. The SSUTLS
framework involves establishing a mutual trust between each one of the communicating
parties prior to initiating the communication. There are a few common public key
cryptographic algorithms that can be used in order for each party to authenticate the other
in the so-called SSL handshaking [27]. Below are brief details on some of those common
cryptographic algorithms. Together with those public key cryptographic algorithms, the
SSL also uses symmetric encryption algorithms like the DES, or triple-DES, and a
message digest algorithm to validate the data integrity.
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1.1.1 RSA
The RSA algorithm works such that the first party uses two very large prime
numbers that are a few hundred digits, p and q, multiply them and send the product to the
other party or parties to serve as the public key k. The other party uses k to encode the
message and sends the encoded message to the first party, which then uses its private
numbers p and q to decode it. Hence, the idea is to use a one way function where k can be
obtained from p and q relatively easily but the inverse is not true [28].

1.1.2

Diffie-Helman (Exponential Key Agreement)
This algorithm depends on the choice of one prime number p and an integer g less

than p. Those two numbers will serve as the public keys. The first party will have a
private number of its own, a, computes ga mod p and sends the result to the other party
which in tum will have a private number of its own, b, so it will compute (ga mod p)b
which is equal to gab mod p. Now the other party will compute gb mod p and sends it to
the first party which will compute (gb mod pt which is equal to gab mod p again. After
this transfer and computation of numbers, both parties will have the same number which
is gab mod p. This number then serves as the shared key between the two parties. Like the
RSA Diffie-Helman algorithm depends on a one way function depending on the
complexity of the discrete logarithm problem [29]. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is
similar to Diffie-Helman algorithm in that it depends on the discrete logarithm problem
as well [30].

1.1.3

Using SSL/TLS as the authentication framework in SCADA communication
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The real value of applying SSUTLS in SCADA is that it is a well tested
framework that is commonly used throughout the internet, and is much less expensive
compared to adopting a new technology tailored to the SCADA networks.
The disadvantages on the other hand, are the facts that SSUTLS

IS

a very

performance consuming framework because of the use of the non inverse functions that
are not needed at all in the SCADA systems because the communication will be between
two SCADA units that actually know each other, not like the communicating parties over
the internet.
1.2 Dissertation organization
This dissertation is divided into

SIX

chapters and two appendices. The second

chapter gives a literature review on the SCADA network systems, the importance of
securing those systems, a comparison between SCADA and IT systems, the SCADA
attack topologies, available solutions, and the authentication role in securing SCADA
systems. Chapter III then establishes the core of this dissertation which is a novel
cryptographic framework for securing SCADA networks in a manner that is less
computationally expensive than using the secured socket layer (SSL). The chapter starts
with a preliminary version of the algorithm called Double Secrecy, and then discusses a
variety of possible attacks, presenting solutions by extending the algorithm. Afterwards,
the algorithm is extended to the N-Secrecy to offer flexibility administering the piece of
information being transferred back and forth through the SCADA networks by defining
the number of secrets required according to the vitality of this information, and then the
whole authentication idea is extended to the idea of authorization to give the N-Secrecy
another dimension. Chapter III then presents another version of the N-Secrecy algorithm
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that is tailored to the test bed available using the Chemical Engineering Department
distillation column, and concludes with brief comparisons between the multiple secrecy
frameworks and a few authentication frameworks.
Chapter IV presents the testing methodology and the testing results of the Double
Secrecy and the N-Secrecy algorithms. The chapter starts with detailing some
information about the way the code is designed and the way it is tested and compared to
the baseline, which consists of three versions of the SSL, depending on whether the
encryption algorithm used is the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Helman, or
elliptic curve. The data presented in this chapter covers the following variables: the
length of the secret being transferred in the message; the way the inner encryption inside
the double secrecy is implemented whether it is DES or Triple-DES, and the three ways
of implementing the SSL.

Chapter IV then switches the gear to presenting the

experimental results of the N-Secrecy, fixing the inner encryption algorithm used to the
Triple-DES and varying two variables; the length of the secret being transferred in the
message, and the number of secrets used. Chapter V commences with presenting a
different type of problem that is the key distribution problem, and how current algorithms
like Diffie-Helman deal with that problem, and propose a new algorithm using computer
algebra techniques.

First, a brief discussion of the new algorithm is presented, then

issues are found and discussed and afterwards solutions are offered to those issues, and
finally, the new algorithm named the Security Spectrum is presented in section 5.3. The
new algorithm is then presented using the notions of the SCADA distillation column test
bed offered by the Chemical Engineering Department. Chapter VI provides conclusions
and directions for future research. All the references that are used in throughout the
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dissertation are gIVen

In

the References. Appendix A contains the code created to

implement the N-secrecy and the security spectrum algorithm together with the code for
the RTU, MTU, and the SSL. Appendix B covers some mathematical concepts used
mainly in chapter V like Grabner bases, ideals, varieties, and polynomial ring theory.
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CHAPTER II
Literature Review
This chapter presents a literature review on the subject of securing SCADA
networks. The emphasis is on the authentication problem, which involves how two units,
typically the RTU and the MTU, authenticate each other prior to establishing
communications. The literature survey presented includes the following topics: (1) an
introduction to the SCADA architectural differences and typical usages of SCADA
systems; (2) discussion of the importance of securing SCADA networks; (3) discussion
of SCADA attack topology vulnerabilities; (4) proposed and available commercial
solutions; (5) SCADA and IT systems; (6) SCADA in relation to cryptography and
authentication; (7) an overview of current research; and (8) discussion of a SCADA test
bed developed at the University of Louisville.

2.1 Introduction, SCADA architectural differences and typical usages
SCADA systems were developed due to the need to control and monitor real-time
processes, like those in oil pipelines, chemical and physical plants, and so forth. These
systems replace human monitoring and promote monitoring at the level of the whole
system and also facilitate remote control from a central location called a master terminal
unit (MTU) [20]. SCADA systems were designed originally to be reliable and easy to use
with very little concern about communication security. The functions of SCADA systems
processes usually require on the order of seconds or tens of seconds to complete.
SCADA architectures can be configured using any of the following communication
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options [20]: point-to-point, where there is a link between each RTU and the master unit;
series communication, where each RTU is connected to the closest RTU in its
neighborhood and so forth until one of the RTUs links directly to the master unit; seriesstar communication, where a certain RTU simulates a hub in its neighborhood and all the
remote units in that neighborhood links to it; multi-drop communication architecture,
where there is like a message bus from the master unit and each remote unit subscribes,
and connects itself to that bus [31]. Connections to remote devices can be made over dial
up, Ethernet LANs, leased lines, or SCADA radios. Some of the operations conducted in
SCADA systems can be processed asynchronously like pulling values in a background
job to be used in generating reports later, and some of the operations need to be
conducted in real-time like some control transactions for aviation systems. Following is a
figure showing a typical example of SCADA communication links according to the
technical report of the American gas association (AGA) published in 2006 [20].
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Figure 2.1: A typical SCADA system network (adapted from AGA [20])

2.2 Importance of securing SCADA networks
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The US Department of Energy states that automated control has helped to
improve the productivity and reliability of energy systems by improving the performance
of the real time transactions and decreasing the backup time [1]. The vulnerability of
SCADA networks to cyber attacks has increased remarkably, since early SCADA designs
did not consider the security risks that arose due to the switch from private and tailormade software, operating systems and telecommunication networks to more general and
open source software, and increasing the use of Internet connected networks [1]. The
National Research Council has identified the security of SCADA systems as one of the
fourteen most important initiatives in making the nation safer [2].
The Committee of Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, of the
National Research Council declared the vulnerability of the power grid's control systems
to cyber attack as a significant challenge in protecting the electric power grid [2].
According to the committee, the special problem that should be reviewed in securing the
SCADA systems is the way data is transmitted between control points in the SCADA
network. Encryption techniques, enhanced firewalls, and cyber intrusion-detection
technologies should be used to improve security and reduce the potential for hacking and
disruption [2] and [5]. Existing surveillance technologies that were developed for defense
and intelligence applications should be investigated for their usefulness in defending
against terrorist attacks [2], [5], and [6].
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defined a strategy
named defense-in-depth, to protect industrial control systems (ICS), to which SCADA
systems belong. This strategy stated that a typical ICS should begin developing security
policies, procedures, and educational material that apply specifically to ICS, and that ICS
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security policies and procedures should be based on the Homeland Security Advisory
System Threat Level, deploying increasingly heightened security postures as the Threat
Level increases. According to the NIST, security should be addressed throughout the life
cycle of the rcs from architecture to procurement to installation, to maintenance, to
decommissioning, and network topology should be implemented for the rcs having
multiple layers, with the most critical communications occurring in the most secure and
reliable layer. Also NrST recommended that a logical separation between the corporate
and rcs networks should be provided [16].
NrST further recommended that a demilitarized zone (DMZ), which is the area
between two firewalls, network architecture should be employed to prevent direct traffic
between the corporate and ICS networks. Critical components on the other hand, should
not have a single point of failure. Critical systems should be designed for fault tolerance
to avoid catastrophic events and in addition, systems should be designed to fail securely.
Unused Internet protocols (IPs), ports and services on rcs devices should be disabled
after testing so that not to compromise ICS operation. A role-based access control should
be implemented, that is to make the ICS networks, devices, and services' physical access
as well as user privileges restricted to only those required to perform specific jobs [16].
According to NrST, ICS networks should have a different authentication paradigm
and credentials than those of the corporate networks. Finally, security controls such as
anti-virus software and intruder detection systems (IDS) should be implemented to
prevent and detect the introduction and accumulation of malicious software to the rcs.
Security techniques such as encryption of rcs communications and data storage should
be applied. In addition, human monitoring and administration should be there all the time.
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2.3 SCADA attack topology vulnerabilities
Existing SCADA protocols were designed to use a rather simple error detection
paradigm like the use of cyclic redundancy codes (CRC), parity checks or similar
technology. The sender of the message will calculate the CRC and append it to the
message. The receiving device, on the other side, will calculate the eRC for the message
and compare it to the value received with the message. If a bit was flipped during
transmission, the CRC indicates a transmission error. Another common characteristic for
SCADA protocols is the fact that they were not designed with built in authentication or
validation services, assuming a level of implicit trust. For example, when a message is
received by an RTU, the source of the message is checked, and if that source is known,
the request is enacted. Furthermore, DNP3 is becoming the standard protocol in the
electric distribution world, and DNP is an open standard, with published information
regarding message structure and vulnerabilities appearing on the Internet.
The ways critical infrastructure can be attacked can be categorized to the
following three modes. The attack can be the classical physical destruction attack to a
critical control or data center; it can come through the communication wires, or through a
compromised trusted party in the network [21]. Most of the currently reported incidents
have an internal origin. Lack of authentication and mixed roles usually result in granting
non-competent users access to critical functionality. On the other hand, the human
machine interface (HMI) helps facilitate attacks by allowing interactions with the system
from a higher level without the need to understand the underlying process. This kind of
visibility, along with the fact that SCADA protocols have no authentication does much of
the work of the attacker. On the other hand, the huge amount of available information
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published on SCADA infrastructure components allows an attacker to discover new
vulnerabilities at a lower level.
Another important fact regarding electric distribution SCADA systems is that they
are geographically dispersed. Some of the SCADA infrastructure components, such as
RTUs or programmable logic controls (PLCs) are usually located in remote locations,
physically dispersed from the central unit, and gaining physical access to the facilities
that house these remote devices is usually trivial. Although these units are physically
remote to the central unit, they are connected to the SCADA system (and potentially to
other corporate networks) logically, offering an attacker a point of entry to an apparently
isolated network. On the other hand, connections to remote devices can be made over dial
up, leased lines, or SCADA radios. Each of these communication methods can be
compromised. For example, SCADA radio is a strong signal, typically one watt. At that
power, the signal can travel more than ten miles providing a significant opportunity for an
adversary to break in without being detected [3].

One final pOint to mention is that

SCADA systems are evolving towards commercial platforms and open protocols (PCs,
TCP/IP, etc.) as time passes which adds the traditional vulnerabilities of these

technologies, like worms, viruses and other malwares on top of vulnerabilities particular
to the SCADA environment [8].

2.4 Proposed and available commercial solutions
2.4.1 Proposed solution on the process level
Most of the literature published on SCADA security addresses the issue from the
process perspective and a very few consider the issue from the technical perspective. Less
detailed articles and white papers have been published to educate company executives
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about SCADA systems, such as "SCADA Security-Advice for CEOs" [11], that
summarizes some of the issues of which company executive should be aware. Examples
include separating the SCADA network from the Internet and the corporate network. This
separation is critical to risk management in modem SCADA systems. Network
architecture weaknesses can significantly increase the risk from Internet and other
sources of intrusion.
One major issue to be handled is confidentiality. SCADA systems were not
designed with security specifications, so there is no standard protocol having built in
authentication. If lower level protocols do not provide this confidentiality then SCADA
transactions are communicated with no authentication, meaning that intercepted
communications may be easily read. Authentication is another very important issue to
keep in mind. Many SCADA systems give little regard to security, often lacking the
memory and bandwidth for sophisticated password or authentication systems. As a result,
there is often no mechanism to identify, authenticate or authorize a system user. Due to its
nature, SCADA systems are mostly stateless, like those of banking ATM machines,
lacking a session structure which, when combined with the lack of authentication, allow
the injection of malicious requests or replies into the system without any prior knowledge
of what has gone on before. The "SCADA Security-Advice for CEOs" article also gives a
brief on where the threat is [11]. Following are some examples of threat sources: (1)
insider attack from employees or ex-employees; (2) organized crime driven by financial
incentive to penetrate SCADA systems; (3) mistakes made as a result of lack of training,
or an oversight; (4) terrorists, and (5) generic Internet threats such as worms, Trojan
horses and viruses that infect systems on the Internet can also affect SCADA systems
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when they use the same software and protocols. Many of the intrusions may not be the
result of a deliberate attack. SCADA systems may be infected merely because there will
always be hackers and virus writers challenged and fascinated with technology.

2.4.2 Proposed solution on the technical level, available commercial solutions
Most of the SCADA solutions that are commercially available now have recently
incorporated some authentication techniques, such as the SEL-3332 Intelligent Server,
relays, remote I/O modules, and the SEL-2411 programmable automation controller,
which uses the following to manage cyber security [7]: Encrypt Ethernet-based
engineering access and SCADA protocols with SSLlTLS; Protect VPN access with IPsec
link security; and Manage access via user accounts.

2.5 SCADA and IT systems
There are two kinds of operating systems in industrial control systems. One of
them uses Windows or UNIX, each of which has role-based security to authorize the user
and direct him to the right information according to his role. The second one is the
control processor software itself that actually retrieves and sorts the data and sends
commands with no means of authentication or authorization [23].
There are several differences between SCADA systems and regular IT systems
making securing the SCADA systems a much harder job than securing the regular IT
systems. A typical workstation or network will run an operation until it is finished. The
real time control system on the other hand will prioritize all the operations in its queue
and will process them accordingly. Whenever a new operation enters the queue, the
prioritization is repeated, meaning that each time a higher priority transaction appears in
the queue it will stop what it is doing. Another important difference is that IT systems

13

upgrade the hardware regularly with no problems. SCADA field devices on the other
hand, often use inexpensive, low cost microprocessors. Some electrical devices in the
industry are still using the 8088 processor introduced in 1978, despite the fact that only
the 486 and later processors can use the encrypted authentication schemes with no
unacceptable delays [23].

2.6 SCADA in relation to cryptography and authentication
The Government Computer News (GCN) published in January, 2005 on its web
site that a SCADA encryption appliance is soon to be commercially available. This
product, called Datacryptor, was designed to be installed between the remote device and
the management console, and it was supposed to support both Modbus and DNP
protocols. The Datacryptor was to use the advanced encryption standard algorithm to
encrypt on-going messages and authenticate the administrators as well via a password
and a security token. It is well conceived that encryption would add latency on the
performance of regular SCADA; the GCN though, said that the Datacryptor would keep
this latency less than 20% and this should be acceptable [22]. The Datacryptor is now
available commercially.
All of the previous discussion points toward authentication as an important partial
solution of current SCADA security problems. The Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL) adopted a project for designing and developing a novel SCADA
communications authenticator technology, funded by the U.S. Navy. The idea behind the
new protocol, called Secure SCADA Communications Protocol (SSCP), was to wrap the
original SCADA communication traffic with a unique identifier and an authenticator [9].
The SSCP then uses the authenticator to authenticate the unique identifier in the
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wrapper to validate the communication, and consequently detect various attack scenarios,
including man in the middle, injected traffic, or message replay. The SSCP is to be
available as an embedded software solution running on the SCADA master or
input/output server. The authenticator technology directly supports the Roadmap to
Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector [12], with milestone targeting widespread
implementation of methods for secure communication between remote-access devices
and control centers.
In terms of the Department of Defense (DOD) technology readiness level
definitions [13], SSCP has currently achieved level seven (i.e., system prototype
demonstration in an operational environment). The goal for this project is to move the
SSCP toward technology readiness (level eight), where the technology has been proven to
work in its final form and under expected conditions. Comprehensive testing will be
performed to confirm that the technology will fulfill its technical objectives when
deployed under a variety of expected conditions in the field. The goal is to facilitate
earlier industry adoption of a novel security technology that is well suited for securing
control systems used by energy infrastructures [14].
Donald Wallace [15] stated that the open nature of the Internet requires careful
consideration of data security measures when implementing Internet-based SCADA
systems. Processes, procedures, and tools must be put in place to address availability,
integrity,

confidentiality,

and protection

against unauthorized users.

Regarding

availability, system up time must be maintained at the highest levels through use of
redundant servers, so that there is no single point of failure. Firewall protection must be
provided in the Gateway and servers along with automated monitoring to detect DNS
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attacks. Regarding integrity, the system must ensure that the data is not modified or
corrupted through the use of encrypted data signatures.
As for confidentiality, the system must ensure restricted access to data through
use of encryption, and to the system by employing authentication frameworks such as
SSL. Regarding protection against unauthorized users, it is realized that multi-layered
password protection must be provided at all levels in the system. In other words there
should be no single sign on (SSO) in SCADA systems.
Much of the literature, discussing the need for SCADA authentication, mentions
SSUTLS as an off-the-shelf solution [3, 7]. Concerns using the SSUTLS as a well
developed Internet technology in authenticating private network systems like the SCADA
arise, as why would public keys be used in a private network and getting the extra
overhead of using an intensively computing irreversible function to encrypt data. SCADA
systems were designed primarily to enhance communication between control systems and
security should not come with the price of sacrificing the performance.
2.7 Overview of Current Research
One of the very interesting initiatives on which research is currently being
conducted is the SCADA Honey Net Project conducted by Cisco Systems, Inc [9], which
is about building honey pots for Industrial Networks. The goal of this project is to
determine the feasibility of building a software-based framework to simulate a variety of
industrial networks such as SCADA architecture. There are several uses for this project:
(1) gathering data on attacker methodologies and tools, so that data mining can be done

later on this data to gain infonnation on attacker trends; (2) testing a live protocol
implementation; and (3) developing research countenneasures, such as device hardening,
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stack obfuscation, and reducing application information [9].
Aside from simulating the real SCADA systems, the other important objective of
the honey net project is to conduct research and eventually block all cyber attacks on
SCADA systems, the group in the SCADA Safe project proposed a new protocol for link
encryption and integrity checking of SCADA messages passed over slow serial lines [10].
They have also started an implementation project for that protocol, and they named it the
SCADA Safe project. That serial SCADA protection protocol (SSPP) is for
cryptographically protecting existing serial-based SCADA communications. A device
that speaks SSPP is known as a SCADA cryptographic module (SCM). A SCADA
message received from a SCADA master or remote unit on SCM plain text port will be
protected and sent out to the SCM cipher text port as an SSPP message.

An SSPP

message received on a SCM cipher text port will be verified, decrypted, and sent out to
the SCM plaintext port. SCM devices are deployed between SCADA devices and
communications links modems. The key point here is that these devices must assure is
data integrity, that is the commands and responses are not forged or altered during
transmission.
2.8 Test Bed configuration
This section gives a brief discussion on the test bed that is going to be used for
testing the suggested cryptographic frameworks. First, the test bed that is available in the
Department of Chemical Engineering is presented and then a brief look at real SCADA
controlled network systems is presented.
The test bed consists of an operating 14 foot, 50 liter, 6 -tray distillation column.
Data collection as well as distillation process control are carried out using actual SCADA

17

hardware and software. The system consists of the distillation column, two temperature
sensors, five flow sensors, two level sensors, and five flow control valves as shown in
figure 2.2 below. The distillation column separates a 20% molar solution of methanol and
water into a distillate with concentration high in methanol (tops product) and a residue,
which is mainly water (bottoms product).
The distillation process, from start up to shut down is monitored and controlled by a
computer-based SCADA control system, specifically iFIX software from GE-Fanuc [25].
A digital to analog and analog to digital terminator panel links the sensors and actuators
to the computer serial port. The distillation column is a MIMO (multiple input-multiple
outputs) process with nine variables that can be controlled: distillate accumulator and reboiler levels, top and bottom temperatures, and distillate, reflux, bottoms, feed and steam
flows. There are nine proportional integral derivative (PID) controllers for these
variables. PID controller tuning parameters and controller set points can be changed.
The time required from start-up to achieve stable operation takes about 3 hours. The
system can be monitored throughout operation and changes can be made to set points
during this time before reaching the desired operating state. Remote monitoring and
control allows a control engineer or operator to use the University's LAN as a control
network and monitor and control the distillation column from a nearby office.
Remote monitoring and control are to be achieved using the HTTP protocol and a
Tomcat web server on the computer connected directly to distillation column sensors and
valves controllers. A computer on the LAN can then connect to the distillation column
control page that provides an HMI interface, pull data values from the server and update
the values of control variables by sending them from the client back to the server.
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The entire system can be viewed as a SCADA system where the iFIX software on
the lab PC collects data from the sensors, makes local control calculations, and sends
control signals to column hardware. The laboratory PC also serves as an RTU for
multiple MTUs and the University LAN provides the network connection between the
RTU and MTUs [24].
Interaction between the iFIX software and the tomcat web server is to be achieved
through two files, INPUTDAT and OUTPUT.DAT Process variables are placed in
OUTPUTDA T by iFIX and iFIX reads the value of certain control variables from
INPUT.DAT.

2.8.1 How this testing bed differs from actual SCADA-controlled distillation column
used in industry,
This test bed environment differs from commercial chemical manufacturing
environments. However, the remote monitoring and control are similar. According to the
research done, the following categories of different SCADA-controlled distillation
columns, have been found
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Figure 2.2 Distillation Column and physical SCADA architecture adapted from [24].

1.

Plant is monitored and controlled with some SCADA software, like the iFIX used
in the above mentioned test bed. However, in our test bed there are digital to
analog and analog to digital terminator panels to link the sensors and actuators to
the computer via serial ports. Whereas, in those actual SCADA controlled
distillation columns, plant data is collected via a hub of TRIO (Taylor Remote
I/O) and sent back to the controller over a high-speed data highway. Custom
graphics and information pages provide the user interface to the system. They
might contain information module system (IMS) nodes to archive all plant data.
They might also have Ole for Process Control (OPCs), to provide connectivity to
third party software packages for web based plant-monitoring, simulation and
reporting, see figure 2.3 below.
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2.

Some chemical plants have multiple processes units that are connected to a
specialized hardware interface. Each specialized interface is then connected to a
central PLC that works as a mediator (hub) and proxy to SCADA software on a
central server connected to a LAN of HMI interface workstations, see figure 2.4
below.
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CHAPTER III
Enhancing SCADA security using multiple levels of secrecy
3.1 Introduction
As mentioned

In

the literature, SCADA systems were designed primarily to

handle the data control and acquisition in an interactive mode. Performance was the
main issue in designing SCADA systems, and security was completely neglected because
all the operations were being conducted in a private network, where security is irrelevant.
Now, being operated in many private networks connected together using public open
networks, the security becomes a crucial issue. Many techniques have been adopted
especially for SCADA, as well as tailoring the proven good techniques such as TLS/SSL.
These techniques however, were either very heavy and performance consuming, or not
secure enough to certain kinds of attacks.
Hence, the problem can be summarized as how to develop a well-secured
framework for SCADA. This framework should be constrained to the SCADA protocol,
typically the DNP3. This framework should be very light in terms of computational
complexity, so as not to sacrifice the performance on behalf of security. This framework
should stand against all kinds of attacks. Finally, this framework should vary the level of
security according to the level of threat.

3.2 First Round: Double Secrecy
The idea is to keep two private keys, two secrets, and a hash table at each unit as
follows:
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1. The general-purpose private key (GPK) between the MTU and all the RTUs that
the MTU communicates,
2. A specific private key (SPK) between the MTU and each RTU,
3. Two secrets between the MTU and each RTU, or each pair of sender-receiver
(SSEC 1 and SSEC2), and

4. A hash table containing Key-Value pairs list that corresponds to a list of SSEC 1(SPK, SSEC2), i.e. Key is SSEC1, and value is (SPK, SSEC2).
To send a message from the MTU to the RTU or vice versa, the following authentication
scenario happens (figure 3.1),
1. The header of the message will be the secret shared between the sender and

the receiver (SSECl) encrypted using the GPK,
2. The message body will contain the actual message encrypted using the SPK,
3. The footer of the message will be SSEC2,

4. The message will be sent to the receiver,
5. The receiver will decrypt the header using the GPK,
6. The receiver will use its own hash table to look up the decrypted message
header,
7. If the hash-table lookup process results in Null, this will mean an

authentication failure. Since, this means that the encrypted header was not SSECI
at the first place,
8. If the hash-table lookup process succeeds, this will mean that the header is
SSEC1, which is then used to get the SPK, and SSEC2,
9. The SPK will then be used to decrypt the footer of the message,
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10. If the value of the decryption equals SSEC2, then the message

IS

authenticated, and
11 . SPK will then be used to decrypt the message.
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Figure 3.1: Double Secrecy authentication framework

3.3 Second Round : Will it stand against various kinds of attacks?
The objecti ve of this section is to determine whether the double secrecy
authentication pattern for protocol security can avert the denial of service (DOS) attacks.
Apparently, the pattern is working fine for all other kinds of attacks like the spoofing, and
man in the middle attack, since it depends on the hash table the two secrets and two
private keys which makes the pattern secure in case of message interception and the
spoofing. DOS attack happens when false messages are sent to the terminal unit, which
has no problem in identifying that those are false messages because of the authentication
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technique used, but the problem happens when those false messages are sent to the
terminal unit in such a high frequency that the unit spends so much time processing the
authentication technique before it figures out that they are false, and eventually the unit
becomes overwhelmed and denies the service to real messages.
The classic solution to this problem is to use some kind of a proxy to block out
the IP address causing those false messages. Now the real problem comes with using the
Spoofing-DOS attack, that is when some intruder gets inside the system of a real
terminal, and sends false messages, because at this time the IP blocking will simply block
the real terminal that is being spoofed, and whenever the spoofing ends and the spoofed
terminal tries to send real messages it discovers that the messages cannot be delivered
because the IP is blocked.
Using Double-Secrecy, the key point is that there are two testes for the message to
be authenticated: first the header of the message should be a key in the receiver terminal
hash-table after being decrypted by the GPK, and secondly, the footer should be the
SSEC2 (from the hash-table) after being decrypted by the SPK. The loss of the
processing time comes because the receiving unit will wait to receive the whole message
and then start processing the first test to know it is a false message, or a potentially
authenticated message. Hence, a kind of inspector component is needed to take the first
packet of the header when it is received and do some pattern matching to check if this
packet is promising to be a part of some key in the hash-table or not. That way, false
messages will be discovered from the very first packet, and whenever, a message header
is a promising one, it will be forwarded to the terminal to proceed with the two testes
(figure 3.2).
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However, three problems arise: (1) sometimes one packet is not enough to block
most of the false messages and keep them from over loading the terminal; (2) the
inspector component itself can get loaded and the same problem of loading and getting
out of service happens with the component, which will then lead to DOS state of the
whole unit; and (3) a major problem is that encryption/decryption functions need not be
linear, in fact almost all of them are not, in a sense that "F (pq) ,.=F (p) F (q)", which
means that even if the message is not false this does not mean that the decryption of the
first packet of the header will be the first packet of the decrypted header.
Those problems can be addressed like this: (1) more than one packet can be used
according to the configuration of the terminal to decide whether the message is false and
the sender should be blocked or not; (2) a vector of inspectors can be used with some sort
of a master inspector component that acts like a load balancer to prevent the inspector
component from getting over-loaded, in a sense that whenever some inspector component
becomes almost loaded, the master inspector will create another inspector component
from the pool of available inspectors, and put it in service. If it happens that all the
inspectors in the pool are in service, the master will simply block this IP until an
inspector becomes free, but this will be for a very short period of time comparing with
the IP blocking technique; and (3) to solve the linearity problem, the key should be
reconstructed in the hash-table so that instead of being SSECI, it can be the result of
concatenating SSECI (first packet) with SSECI (rest of the packet).
3.4 Third Round: N-Secrecy Authentication Framework
The objective of this round is to make the level of security on the SCADA
systems protocols vary on demand, that is initializing it on level L and increasing to L2 in
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case of sending more vital messages, or detecting an increase of the threat level, and
fUl1her increase it, say to level LlO, in case of being under severe attack. Previous
sections introduced a novel framework for authenticating the communication between
two parties depending on two secrets, and two private keys.

,

1 MT Uencrypts the
message bocl)" and
footer vl"ith the RTU
private key
SPK

• •

~ Encrypt

'..C"",.,
3. MTU sends message

'" • •

• ...to RTU

1'.- ...

'"

o· .0 t'

5. RrU <k'n-ts II",
~ ". !ltspectm d".,ryptshea.d.el us~ GPK ~'
.
lir;! pacl:ets usiltg ......
Decrypt
GPK
.. J , . , .
.Heaeler
l1

tl Decry'Pt J lI ,lI
first
Jackets

•

6. RrUd-".,k;lruh
toble, altd d,,"'j-pts IIle
footer

6.01lj"Ii.TUplwaie
key Call de:lYPt t1..,
footer _ltd tl.., body of

• •
2. MT Uencrypts the
message header 'lVith
the general private key
GPK

+

~'

~""

.,
,~ . Decrypt
I
Body

II", message.

Encrypt

Figure 3.2: Modified Double Secrecy authentication framework implementing the inspector technique

The idea here is to generalize the double secrecy authentication framework to use
N+ 1 secrets instead of two. The exact algorithm is as follows:
1. The header of the message contains the secret shared between sender and the receiver

(SSECO) encrypted using the GPK,
2. The footer of the message contains n secrets, where n>O,
3. The message body contains the actual message encrypted using the SPKn,
4. The message is sent to the receiver,
5. The receiver decrypts the header using the GPK,
6. The receiver uses its own hash table to look up the decrypted message header,
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7. If the hash-table lookup process results in Null, this would mean an authentication
failure,

8. If the hash-table lookup process succeeds, this will mean that the header is SSECI,
which is then used as a key in the hash-table to give a vector of pairs (SPKi, SSECi);
i=1..n,
9. The length of those secrets is known for both the sender and the receiver,
10. An iteration is being done to read the SSECi length number of bytes of the footer,
decrypt them using SPKi, and compare it to the SSECi,
11. If the comparison succeeds, then the index i is incremented, to read the next one,
12. If comparison fails at any stage, then the sender is not authenticated,
13. SPKn is then used to decrypt the message.

3.5 Final Round: N-Secrecy Authentication/Authorization Framework
Since authentication only is not enough to undergo vital procedures that messages
might have, like unlocking dams or cutting circuits, another level of security, which is the
authorization, is introduced. Authorization checks with other administration master units
to verify if this master unit is authorized to request such procedures. This authorization
workflow should again be dependent on the level of importance of that operation. Hence,
in this round, both of those frameworks are mixed up together to make the level of
authentication more generic depending on N secrets instead of two as well as making this
variation declarative, and dependent on the operation.
Each terminal unit will be organized in such a way that, there is a master
component, and a vector of operation components, those operation components will be
categorized in a hierarchical manner. For every node, there will be corresponding
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authentication and authorization attributes, and for every child node, the attributes will be
accumulated from the ancestor; the authentication attribute required to unlock a dam, for
example, will be an aggregation of the perform, unlock, and dam nodes' authentication
attributes. Those attributes will contain the multiplicity N of the N-Secrecy authentication
algorithm, mentioned above, and the authorization workflow required (figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Message operation hierarchy example

Hence, the key point here is that there are n+ 1 tests for a message to be
authenticated. Now the overall scenario will be that the first secret, which is SSECO, will
contain some information about the type of operation, so that the master component in
the terminal unit will forward the message to the right operator component that will have
the n-multiplicity to be used so far. The more secrets are read, through the n-Secrecy
framework, and testes are passed, the more information the operator component knows
about the kind of operation the sender needs, and accordingly forwards to the right node
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beneath it, and then we have a new n-multiplicity. That way the level of authentication is
dynamic and depends on the level of importance of some particular operation.

3.6 Binding the multiple Secrecy algorithms with real SCADA
This section concerns with the application of the multiple secrecy algorithms with
real SCADA systems. In section 2.8, a brief description of the SCADA test bed that is
available in the laboratory of the Department of Chemical Engineering was presented.
Now, the Double Secrecy algorithm is rewritten below from the perspective of this test
bed.

3.6.1 Double secrecy algorithm using the test bed
Two wrapper software components will be developed and attached to each party,
the MTU and the iFIX Pc. The wrapper will work as a fa<;ade to the receiver and a
mediator to the sender.
The following is the double secrecy algorithm using the above mentioned test bed,
see figure 3.4 below,
1.

The INPUT.DAT is sent as a message from the sender,

2.

The sender Wrapper component gets the message,

3.

The header of the message, which can be the time-stamp, contains the secret
shared between sender and receiver (SSECl) encrypted using the GPK,

4.

The message body contains the actual message, which is INPUT.DAT, encrypted
using the SPK,

5.

The footer of the message, which can be the number of characters contained in the
INPUT.DAT

input file, contains SSEC2,
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6.

The message is sent to the receiver, which is the iFIX Wrapper component on the
lab PC,

7.

The receiver wrapper decrypts the header using the GPK,

8.

The receiver wrapper uses its own hash table to look up the message header.

9.

If the hash table lookup process results in Null, this would mean an authentication

failure. Since, this means that the encrypted script was not SSEC1 in the first
place,
10.

If the hash-table lookup process succeeds, this will mean that the header is SSEC1,

which is then used to get the SPK, and SSEC2,
11.

The SPK is then used to decrypt the footer of the message,

12.

If the value of the decryption equals the SSEC2, then the message is authenticated,

13.

SPK is then used to decrypt the message, and get the INPUT.DAT input file,

14.

The input file is then used to run the distillation column process, and the output file
OUTPUT.DAT is generated,

15.

Now the whole process is repeated to encrypt the OUTPUT.DAT and send it to the
MTU and MTU uses the same way to authenticate it at the other side.
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Figure 3.4 Double secrecy framework using distillation column testing bed

3.7 Multiple Secrecy algorithms and Other Authentication Frameworks
This section gives brief comparisons between the double secrecy and N-secrecy in
general and the other authentication frameworks like SSL, digital signatures, and
challenge response.

3.7.1 Multiple Secrecy and SSL
The double secrecy depends on two levels of the security, which makes it secure,
and the N-secrecy depends on N secrets, which increases the level of security even more
and makes it on demand. From the discussions in 3.2 and 3.4, it is clear that the double
secrecy and the N-secrecy in general, do not use public key cryptography, like SSL,
because using one-way mappings to encrypt data requires high intensive computation,
which would degrade the performance significantly. Hence, the Double and N-secrecy
have better petformance than the SSL and very secure at the same time.

3.7.2 Multiple Secrecy and Digital Signatures
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Like the public key encryption, the digital signature framework uses a public
key and a private key. In this authentication framework there is a hash digest, which
consists of a timestamp and the message to be sent or a part of it. The sender then uses
its own private key to encrypt the digest, and sends the message together with the
encrypted digest to the receiver. The receiver uses the public key to decrypt the digest,
and calculates the digest in its own using the timestamp and the unencrypted received
message, and compares the two digests together to decide the authenticity of the sender
[33]. Compared with the digital signatures framework, the double and the N-secrecy are
more secure because they depend on the validation of at least two secrets and not just
one, and the message itself is encrypted, which is not the case in digital signatures,
where the plain message is sent unencrypted. The multiple secrecy frameworks are also
lighter than the digital signatures framework since it does not use public key encryption.

3.7.3 Multiple Secrecy and Challenge Response
The challenge response framework is used when one of the two communicating
units need to verify that the other is authentic prior to sending a vital control message or
on a periodical manner. In this framework the two units share a secret, and when one of
the units try to verify the identity of the other it sends a challenge consisting of a random
number. The receiver then adds the secret to the received random number, calculates the
hash digest and sends it back to the sender as the response. The sender then compares the
challenge and the response to decide the authenticity of the receiver [33]. Comparing the
double and the N-secrecy with this framework, they are still more secure because the
security depends on more than two secrets and not just one. They are also lighter because
the challenge response depends on the digital signature, which in tum depends on the public
key encryption.
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CHAPTER IV
Prototype Implementation and Experimental Results
In the previous chapter, a new authentication approach was presented. This approach
has multiple levels of security, which can vary depending on the level of threat, from
Double Secrecy to N-Secrecy. This chapter presents a prototype implementation of both
Double Secrecy and N-Secrecy algorithms with the experimental results compared to the
SSL results as the opponent authentication framework.

4.1 Test bed configuration and Testing Methodology
Testing has been conducted in the Intelligent Systems Research Laboratory (ISRL) at
the University of Louisville. Two machines within the SCADA test-bed have been used
to simulate the MTU and the RTU. A PC running Windows XP operating system with
2.79 GHz Intel® Pentium® D processor having 2GB RAM was used as an MTU and a
similar configuration PC was used as the RTD.
Four code packages were implemented, debugged and tested. They are summarized
below, with complete listing in Appendix A.
1. A baseline control which is a pure socket connection simulating the DNP3
communication protocol between the two units for a transfer of a simple text file,
2. An implementation of the SSL framework using RSAlIBMx509 and Diffie-Helman
as the authentication algorithms,
3. An implementation of the double secrecy algorithm using DES as the encryption
algorithm,
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4. An implementation of the double / N-Secrecy algorithms using the Triple-DES as the
encryption algorithm.
A component diagram representing the architecture of the prototype is presented in
figure 4.1 below. A class called Unit is coded to present the internal authentication
functionality of a unit and is then wrapped in two classes, the RTU and the MTU classes,
where the DNP3 communication protocol functionality is implemented. The visitor
design pattern is used so that according to the parameters passed from the RTU to the
MTU or vice versa, the Unit object can use the SSL authentication visitor, the Double
Secrecy authentication visitor, the N-Secrecy authentication visitor or no security at all.
Each authentication visitor has its own package where specific implementation
classes exist to implement the internal functionality of each type of authentication.

I
I

______________________ JI

SSL authentication vis ito

OS authentication visito

US authentication visito

Figure 4.1: Prototype implementation component diagram

4.2 Double Secrecy and N-Secrecy, Prototype Implementation
The following sub sections describe the four scenarios of the testing, the one with no
security at all, the one with double secrecy, the one with N secrecy, and the one with SSL
authentication.
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4.2.1 No security implementation
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Figure 4.2: No security implementation sequence diagram

Following is the explanation of the no security implementation represented

In

the

sequence diagram above.
1. RTU application class runs first,
2. MTU application class runs, and creates an instance of the Unit class,
3. MTU then calls uniLprepareMsgO which actually does nothing here in the no security
package,
4. After the connection happens between the MTU and the RTU, MTU sends the prepared
message to the RTU,
5. After, RTU receives the message from the MTU, RTU calls unit.setMsgO
4.2.2 Double Secrecy implementation
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Figure 4,3 : Double Secrecy implementation sequence diagram

Following is the explanation of the double secrecy implementation represented

In

the

sequence diagram above.
1. RTU application class runs first,
2. MTU application class runs , and creates an instance of the Unit class,
3. Unit then calls assignKeysAndSecretsO method inside its constructor which creates an
instance of the StringEncrypter class,
4. MTU then calls unit.prepareMsgO which in tum calls the encrypt method of Unit which
calls the stringEncrypter.encrypt, with the first secret ssec 1 and the general key GPK to
construct the header of the message,
5. The footer is constructed as the encryption of the second secret ssec2 with the SPK as the
encryption key,
6. Finally, the body of the message is constructed as the encryption of the message itself
with the SPK as the encryption key,
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7. After the connection between the MTU and the RTU

IS

established, MTU sends the

prepared message to the RTU,
8. After, RTU receives the message from the MTU, RTU calls unit.setMsgO,
9. The RTU afterwards calls the unit.authenticateMsgO method to authenticate the message,
10. The Unit instance decrypts the encrypted header with the GPK, using the
StringEncrypter decryptO method, to construct the header of the original message,
11. The footer is is being constructed as the decryption of the encrypted footer with the SPK
as the decryption key, and the message content as the decryption of the encrypted body
using the SPK as the encryption key.

4.2.3 N-Secrecy implementation
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Figure 4.4: N Secrecy implementation sequence diagram

Following is the explanation of the N secrecy implementation represented in the sequence
diagram above.
1. RTU application class runs first,
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2. MTU application class runs, and creates an instance of the Unit class, passing the security
level, i.e. the number of secrets required,
3. Unit then calls assignKeysAndSecretsO method inside its constructor which creates an
instance of the StringEncrypter class, and sets the hash table containing the pairs (SPKi,
SSECi); i=l .. n,
4. MTU then calls unit.prepareMsgO which in tum calls the encrypt method of Unit which
calls the stringEncrypter.encrypt, with the first secret ssec[O] and the general key
encKey[O] to construct the header of the message,
5. The footer is constructed as the concatenated string composed of the encryption of the
secret ssec[i] using the key encKey[i] for all i< the given securityLevel,
6. Finally, the body of the message is constructed as the encryption of the message itself
with the last key in the array encKey[securityLevel-1],
7. After the connection between the MTU and the RTU is established, MTU sends the
prepared message to the RTU,
8. After, RTU receives the message from the MTU, RTU calls unit.setMsgO,
9. The RTU afterwards calls the unit.authenticateMsgO method to authenticate the message,
10. The Unit instance decrypts the encrypted header with encKey[O], using the
StringEncrypter decryptO method, to construct the header of the original message,
11. The footer is being constructed inside a loop using the previous step key to decrypt the
current step,
12. Finally, the message content is constructed as the decryption of the encrypted body using
the final key in the loop.

4.3 Experimental Results for Double Secrecy
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Experiments were performed to measure the performance between the Double
Secrecy, SSL, and the control. A small 4B text file on the MTU machine represents the
information to be transferred to the RTU machine. Regular generated triple-DES key
sizes; 24B were used as the GPK and SPK in the Double Secrecy implementation.
Secret files ranging from lOB to lKB were used for SSECI and SSEC2. Results are
divided into the following categories: DNP3 messaging with no security implemented;
DNP3 with TLS/SSL implemented using Diffie-Hellman as the public key exchange
algorithm; and DNP3 with TLS/SSL implemented using RSA as the public key exchange
algorithm in table 4-1 and DNP3 with Double Secrecy implemented using DES on a set
of secret files and DNP3 with Double Secrecy implemented using Triple-DES on the
same set of secret files in table 4-2. Results shown in those tables present the averages of
ten different readings. All times were measured in milliseconds.
Table (4.1): Average and standard deviation of DNP3 messaging total time from MTU to RTU with no
security implemented, and with SSL implemented

Security framework implemented on DNP3

Average

Standard deviation

No security (control)

23.1

4.77

SSL (Diffie-Hellman)

2497.6

90.5

SSL (RSA)

2663

120.3
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Table (4.2): Average and standard deviation of DNP3 messaging total time from MTU to RTU with
different combinations of double secrecy

Security framework implemented on DNP3

Double Secrecy** implemented using DES

Double Secrecy implemented using Triple-DES

Secret file length*

Average

10

50.2

20

53.4

30

63.3

40

59.7

50

5l.5

100

56.9

500

550.5

1000

643.4

10

45.1

20

53.7

30

45.5

40

73.3

50

58.3

100

65.8

500

573.5

1000

632.3

*AlI files' SIzes are measured In bytes
**This is the message preparation plus the message authentication time

As shown in the table 4.1 the average of total messaging time in TLS/SSL was 2497.6
milliseconds usmg Diffie-Hellman as the public key exchange algorithm and 2663
milliseconds usmg RSA as the public key exchange algorithm, the average of the
messaging time in double secrecy, as shown in table 4.2, using DES lies in the average of
50 milliseconds when secrets are shorter than or equal to 100 bytes, and in the average of
500 milliseconds when secrets are larger than or equal to 500 bytes, which is a very large
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size for a secret file. On the other hand, the double secrecy algorithm implemented using
Triple-DES encryption showed very similar results, which shows a dramatic
improvement of the double secrecy over the TLS/SSL even with large secret files and
Triple-DES encryption.
It should be noted that the messaging time mentioned above with regards to the

TLS/SSL implementation is only the negotiation/authentication time. There is also the
certificates issuance time, which was not investigated here. This is typically a one-time
event. However, the major problem with the TLS/SSL is the need for a third party to
issue the certificates and the cipher codes. This third party involvement is not a part of
the double secrecy algorithm, where everything can be initiated and administered inhouse.

In summary, a simulation of the SCADA systems has been implemented using
distributed machines switching messages over the DNP3 protocol. The messaging has
been done using no security at all, using TLS, and using the double secrecy for
authentication on small and larger secrets over using the DES and Triple-DES as the
encryption algorithms. The results showed that Double Secrecy using DES or Triple-DES
gives a response time within the service level limits of almost all process system SCADA
installations, and that this response time is significantly better than that using the
TLS/SSL as a method for authentication.

4.4 N-Secrecy, Experimental Results
Results of N-Secrecy implemented using Triple-DES on large secrets (lOObytes) are
shown in Table 4.3, using three, four, and five secrets respectively. In those results ten
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readings were taken and the averages and standard deviations were computed. All times
were measured in milliseconds.
Table (4.3): Average and standard deviation ofDNP3 messaging total time from MTU to RTU
with N-Secrecy implemented using Triple-DES on large secret files using N=3, 4, 5, and 6

Number of secrets used for N Secrecy

Average

N",3

530.5

N",4

760.2

N=5

945.6

N",6

1020.4

As shown in table 4.3 the average of total messaging time in N-secrecy using TripleDES with large three secrets was 530.5 milliseconds, the average using four large secrets
was 760.2 milliseconds, the average using five large secrets was 945.6 milliseconds, and
finally the average using six large secrets was 1020.4 which still shows a dramatic
improvement over the TLS/SSL even with large secret files and Triple-DES encryption,
and multiple secrets corresponding to the state of the attack.
It should also be noted that this total time is the message preparation time plus the

message authentication time. Since SCADA operations are known upfront for both units,
the total time can be further improved by preparing a large portion of the message at the
start up of both units.
In summary, a simulation of the SCADA systems has been implemented usmg
distributed machines exchanging messages over DNP3 protocol. The messaging has been
done using N-secrecy with three, four and five large secrets, over triple DES encryption
and compared with the results obtained from the TLS. Results showed that increasing the
number of secrets did not affect the total messaging time.
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CHAPTER V
Computer Algebra techniques for Enhancing SCADA security
5.1 Introduction
When two parties, typically two units or an RTU with MTU, try to authenticate
each other prior to sending any vital information, or committing any vital transaction at
the other side, they must share a secret. In a computation, this secret is a string of binary
characters. The power of the secret/key combination, and how difficult it is to break, is
the most important measure of the power of the security system implemented in the
communication between those two parties. The problem is how to share the secret
information. Should it be done through a secured line of communication, but how can this
communication line be judged to be secure enough, and how can a successful
authentication process be conducted on it?
This problem of key exchange has two common solutions: 1.) the Diffie-Hellman
algorithm that depends on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm problem and
is equivalent to the integer factorization problem, and 2.) the RSA algorithm that depends
on the difficulty of factoring large prime numbers. Recently, elliptic curve public
cryptography was developed [32]. All of these commonly used algorithms depend on the
complexity of some problems in the theory of numbers. In this chapter, new algorithms
are presented to model the real setting of the two communicating units, and the
communication line in between, using polynomial ring theory with the Grobner bases
algorithm to complete the solution.
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First, the Security Spectrum algorithm is discussed, and then a detailed example is
presented. A comparison between this algorithm and Diffie-Helman algorithm concludes
the chapter.

5.2 Solution overview
The cornerstone

In

the solution is to build a logical bridge between the two

parties. This bridge will be referred to as the security spectrum of the two parties. The
security spectrum between any two parties is unique to these parties. It changes if anyone
of the intrinsic or boundary conditions of either one of the two parties or the line of
communication between them changes. Each one of the two parties generates its secrets
individually and on a periodical manner. The way the authentication happens is by
checking the correlation between the secret and the spectrum. This means that the two
secrets generated on the two parties need not be the same but they should be correlated to
the same spectrum. There will be a level for this correlation, so that each piece of
transaction will have a threshold for the level of correlation accepted.

5.2.1 Issues
There are several issues that must be addressed. A first key issue is to find a way
to model the intrinsic, boundary, and communication conditions for the two
communicating parties, to build up the spectrum, then find a way for party A to generate
a random secret correlated with that spectrum. The user must find a computationally
reasonable way to encode that secret. In operation, the user must decode the secret at
party B in a one-one corresponding encoding/decoding fashion, and finally make party B
decide for certain if the secret is correlated to the spectrum between that party, and party
A, that is to find a unique solution for the decidability problem.
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5.2.2. Solutions
First addressing the conditions representation, each condition can be thought of as
a non linear function of some physical variables, model these physical variables as
symbols, and model the whole condition as a non-linear polynomial of these symbols,
which will then be the variables of that polynomial. Then the whole condition can be
represented geometrically as the variety object in the space KID where K is the field in
which the ground values of the variables belong to, typically the field of real numbers,
and m is the space dimension. Modeling all the conditions that way, as a system of nonlinear polynomials, corresponding to a set of varieties in the space KID makes the area of
intersection of these varieties resembles the ideal generated by all these polynomials.
That way we can generate our spectrum as the ideal generated by the system of nonlinear polynomials representing the physical conditions of communication between the
two parties. (An overview of ideals is included in Appendix B).
Now addressing the issue of the correlation, this can be found in the answer of the
question "does this secret, represented as a new polynomial, rely in the ideal generated by
the conditions' polynomials or not?" To generate a new secret at either party that is
correlated to the spectrum, a polynomial that is a linear combination of the conditions'
polynomials, and clearly there are an infinite number of these combinations, will be
correlated to the spectrum for sure. Finally, for the other party to decide if the sent
polynomial, representing the secret, is authenticated or not, that is to say if it is correlated
to the spectrum or not, it is the same as to say that the polynomial belongs to the ideal

generated by the spectrum of conditions' polynomials.
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This is equivalent geometrically to decide if some geometrical variety belongs to
the intersection area between a group of varieties or not. This previously mentioned
problem is called the uniform word problem, and the problem is that the solution to this
problem is not unique. Therefore another approach is needed, and for this research the
Grobner Basis is used to resolve the non-uniqueness problem.

5.3 Security Spectrum Algorithm
Before stating the security spectrum algorithm, it is worth noting that this
algorithm, like all the key distribution algorithms, runs as an offline operation. Following
is the detailed algorithm for the Security Spectrum approach:
1. Intrinsic conditions of each of the two parties are gathered,
2. Physical conditions of the communication between the two parties are gathered,
3. A modeling of all these conditions is done to generate a group of polynomials
describing the whole system of communication,
4. The security spectrum of the two parties is constructed as the Grabner basis of this
system of polynomials,
5. Party A generates a linear combination of the polynomials constructing the spectrum,
to be the secret, this secret
6. The secret gets encoded, and sent to party B,
7. Party B decodes the secret,
8. Party B, runs the uniform word problem algorithm, to decide uniquely if the secret
sent is correlated with the spectrum or not, which is an answer to the authentication
problem,
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9. Party B, runs the correlation level algorithm to determine the level of correlation, and
decide if this level of correlation authorizes party A, or not. An answer to the
authorization problem.

5.4 Using the Security Spectrum algorithm in a SCADA application
As done in chapter III, this section concerns with the application of the Security
Spectrum algorithm with real SCADA systems. The simplified version of the test bed
available using the Chemical Engineering Department distillation column is considered
as an emulator for a real SCADA systems.
First the intrinsic conditions of each of the MTU and the iFIX, basically all the
control loops and all the relevant equations are gathered. For these controls case, these
will be the processing blocks, which will generate a system of polynomials describing the
whole system of communication. Next the security spectrum of the two parties is
constructed using the Grobner basis of this system of polynomials. Afterwards, party A,
MTU wrapper generates a linear combination of the polynomials constructing the
spectrum, to be the header of the message, the INPUT.DAT input file is encoded using
this header and put as the body of the message. The message then gets sent to party B, the
iFIX. On the other side, party B wrapper, runs the uniform word problem algorithm, to
decide uniquely if the header of the sent message, the secret, is correlated with the
spectrum or not, an answer to the authentication problem. Party B wrapper, runs the
correlation level algorithm to determine the level of correlation, and decide if this level of
correlation authorizes party A, or not, an answer to the authorization problem. If the
message is authenticated the body is decrypted using the header, and the input file is then
used to run the distillation column process, and the output file OUTPUT.DAT is
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generated. Now the whole process is repeated to encrypt the OUTPUT.DAT and send it
to the MTU. MTU will use the same way to authenticate it at the other side. This is all
shown in a block diagram form in Figure 5.1.

5.5 Example
The following simplified example uses a control model system to demonstrate the
approach. Let's take as an example, one of the distillation column control blocks called
PID block, which is intended to maintain balance in a closed loop by changing the
controlled analog input variable in response to deviations from a user defined set point.

5.5.1 Collecting the intrinsic and boundary conditions
The PID block itself has two typical flows, the PID block's feedback tag
illustrated below in Figure 5.2, and a specific cascade control with Master/Slave PID
blocks Figure 5.3. In addition we have the steady state PID block algorithm equation.

Figure 5.1 Security Spectrum framework using distillation column testing bed
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Analog Input
Block

Analog Input
Block

Analog Output
Block

------------1

Process ....

Figure 5.2 PID block's feedback tag

Master PID
Block

Analog Output
Block

Slave PID
Block

Boiler----------Control Valve

Figure 5.3 cascade control
with Master/Slave PID blocks

5.5.2 Modeling the conditions in polynomial format
Here are the Representation rules,
1. Each block is a symbol,

a.

Xo

for PID block,

b.

Xl

for Analog Input block,

c.

X2

for Analog Output block,
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d.

X3

for Feedback tag,

e.

X4

for Analog Input block II,

f.

Xs

for Slave

g.

X6

for Master PID block,

h.

X7

for Flow transmitter,

1.

X8

for the control valve,

J.

X9

for the boiler.

PID

block,

2. The flow from one node X to another Y is represented by the monomial XY,
3. The flows from node X to another Y, and then from node Z to C, is given by the
polynomial XY + Zc.
Following the above-mentioned rules, we have the following polynomials,
For Fig5.2,
l.

P1=XjXo+ XOX2+ X2X3+ X3XI,

2.

P2=XIXO+ XOX2+ X2X3+ X3X4+ X4XO,

For Fig5.3,
1.

P3=X7XI+ XIXS+ X5X2+ X2X8+ X9X4+ X4X6,

2.

P4=X7XI+ X\Xs+ X5X6+ XSX2+ X2x8+ X9X4+ X4X6,

Buchberger's algorithm for computing Grobner Bases was implemented, see
appendix A for code listings. The idea behind Buchberger's algorithm is simply to order
the polynomials of the whole system using a given term order, and then construct a type
of polynomials designated as the s-polynomials. An s-polynomial is constructed from two
polynomials by removing the leading terms of both of them using the least common
multiple term for their leading terms, and then subtracting one from the other.
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Afterwards, the resultant polynomial is checked for the existence in the ideal by running
the Euclidean di vision algorithm. If the s-polynomial is not in the ideal, it is added to the
system of polynomials and another couple of polynomials is chosen to compute the new
s-polynomial, and so forth until all the polynomials in the system prove to be in the ideal.

5.5.3 Algorithm Snapshot
Having modeled the control blocks in polynomials format, below are the full steps
of the algorithm.
1. The polynomials should be ordered in the right term order in order to compute
Grobner basis for them. Assuming that

XO>Xl>X2> .. 'Xn

and so forth, the original

system of polynomials is:

2. Running the Grobner bases code, the following system of polynomials
obtained,
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IS

Ps=

-XOX1X7 - XOXZXS - XOX4 X9 + XZ X 3XS + X3 X 4X S,

P9= -XOX1X7

- XOXZXS + XOX4XS -XOX4X6 - XOX4X 9 - XOXSX6 + X3 X4 XS,

P IO= -XSX6

3. Now assume that the MTU needs to send the transaction 'abc' to the RTD. The
MTU will construct a message composed of a message header and a body, where
the body of the message will be the transaction content,
4.

The header of the message will be the secret. This secret will be any linear
combination of the ten polynomials above representing the ideal, or the security
spectrum,

5. Let the header be:

10

P s -1.5 P IO + P s :::

-XOX1X7 - XOXZ X 8 - xox4(10 +X9)+ lOx1x3 + XZX3XS - x3x4(10 +xs)- 1.5XSX6

6. The message is sent to the RTU,
7. RTU runs the uniform word problem code, see Appendix A, to resolve the
decidability of the existence of the header in the spectrum,
8. The uniform word problem code gives an affirmative response and the MTU is
authentIcated,
9. The message body is extracted.

5.5.4 Analysis of the security spectrum algorithm example snapshot
Noting how large the above system of hypothetical non-linear polynomials is, and
knowing the fact that in reality we may have hundreds of those non-linear
polynomials modeled using more sophisticated models, it is extremely unlikely that
an intruder can spoof the RTU or the receiver in general. So the confidence that no
unauthorized person or machine can send a false message is very high.
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The real problem is with the man-in-middle attack since an intruder cutting In the
middle and getting the message will simply get the message in the message body,
which can be an important information. The solution to this problem is to use the
security spectrum only to generate the secretes) and use the double secrecy or the Nsecrecy in general to do the whole authentication framework. In other words, use the
N-secrecy as the authentication framework and the security spectrum as the secret
generator and authorization framework. In this case the security spectrum algorithm
can be run on an offline basis to generate the secrets and the keys needed in the Nsecrecy and transfer those keys and secrets via ROM device into the SCADA units as
part of the administration of the system, and then those keys and secrets can be used
on an online basis to secure the transactions. Multiple channels can also be used to
resolve the key distribution problem, by generating the keys and secrets and emailing
them to the other administrators of the distributed SCADA system, and then using the
N-secrecy authentication framework. All the steps of the above example use the
security spectrum as the key generator algorithm and the double secrecy as the
authentication framework, as shown in Figure 5.4.

5.6 Security Spectrum and Diffie-Hellman
The whole difference between the security spectrum and Diffie-Hellman
algorithms is the fact that the latter depends on the theory of numbers, the modulo ring
theorem and the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem as mentioned in section
1.1.2, whereas, the security spectrum depends on the real context of the problem of
communication between the two parties, and the complexity of resolving the uniform
word problem as mentioned in appendix B. Diffie-Hellman,
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IS

also known to be

vulnerable to the man in middle attack, because an intruder can simply intercept a party's
public value and sends a different one to the other party. That way, the intruder can
decrypt all the messages sent between the two parties and even more, can send his own
fake messages. An intruder intercepting any messages from two communicating parties
over the security spectrum framework, on the other hand, will not benefit at all from that
piece of information neither by understanding nor by using it to later deceive one of the
two parties because it depends on the context of the problem not on a known
mathematical problem.
A further note is that the security spectrum can strengthen by wrapping the whole
framework by the N-Secrecy framework. That is to use the N-Secrecy to encode/decode
the secret polynomial that is being sent between the two parties.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusions and Future Directions

In the introduction of this dissertation an argument was presented on whether it is
better to use well known security technologies and frameworks like the SSUTLS or to
use tailored frameworks to secure the SCADA systems.
The argument was that the well-known frameworks are more mature and less
expensive but on the other hand they can cost a lot on the performance side. Hence, the
objective of this dissertation is to find new cryptographic approaches that have the same
security level offered by those well-known security frameworks, particularly the SSL,
without compromising the performance. Two trials were done in this dissertation to
achieve the above-mentioned goal, named the N-Secrecy and the security spectrum. The
concluding remarks regarding the two frameworks are presented below.

6.1 Conclusions
6.1.1 N-Secrecy

In chapter three the idea of the multiple levels of secrecy was first introduced. The
double secrecy algorithm was presented and clearly it depends on symmetric (private
key) encryption using two secrets and two keys to encrypt and decrypt those secrets,
which means that there is no use at all for the trapdoor one way mapping that the public
key encryption algorithms like the RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Helman depend upon. This
means that the double secrecy should be better than the SSL in terms of performance. As
for the security, later sections in the same chapter discussed the strength of the double
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secrecy against the Spoofing-DOS attack, where an inspector component was added to
the framework to take the first packet of the message header and do some pattern
matching to check if it is a promising packet to be a part of some key in the hash-table or
not. Afterwards, the level of secrecy was extended from two to a general number N
depending on the level of secrecy desired based maybe on the level of confidentiality or
vitality the message has.
Chapter IV presented the experimental results of the double secrecy USIng a
number of secrets ranging from lObytes to one KB. Results showed that the double
secrecy took in the range of one thousandth of the SSL running time in most of the
secrets used. Also, the N-secrecy experimental results represented in the same chapter
showed that using a large secret files and Triple-DES as the symmetric encryption
algorithm still cost much less than the SSL even when the level of secrets was increased
to 6.

6.1.2 Security Spectrum
Chapter V presented another new security framework called the security spectrum
which tried to construct a physically meaningful bridge between the two communicating
parties rather than depending on meaningless complex mathematical problems like the
problem of discrete logarithm in the case of Diffie-Helman and the non inverse mapping
prime numbers problem in case of the RSA. The complexity of the problem here depends
on building a logical bridge composed of polynomials representing physical conditions of
the two communicating parties ancIJor the communicating network.
An example was represented in the chapter to present the whole idea. The
example however, used a trivial way of modeling the conditions into polynomials. Next
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section

In

this chapter presents a novel mathematical modeling technique for control

systems. Work on this modeling technique can be completed in a future research work.

6.2 Directions for Future Research
6.2.1 Modeling
This section focuses on presenting a novel mathematical model for control
systems using context free grammars and non-deterministic finite automata.
A typical control system consists of flows of control blocks, and flows from
control blocks to each others. These flows can happen in sequence, or they can happen in
parallel. A typical control system also contains some processing, and valves for multiple
branches.

6.2.1.1 Modeling using context free grammars
A map from a control system to a grammar, can be built such that, a non trivial
block is considered a non terminal block, each final operation is considered a terminal
block, each flow from a block to another is considered a production rule, and finally, each
valve is considered an "or" operation in the corresponding production rule.
Using this map, a control system can be considered a federation of many
grammars generating a language of transactions based on the different production rules
relevant to the different flow control blocks. Each branch on the syntax tree generated by
a given grammar can be modeled as a monomial of the block terms. Summing up all the
branches using the "+" operator, a polynomial representing this block can be generated
for that given grammar for that given block. A system of polynomials can then be
generated for all the blocks in the system.
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In the next two sections the ground group and ring will be constructed based on
the syntax tree representing the control system grammar transactions. Once this ground
ring has been constructed the corresponding polynomial ring can then be used to build up
the model.

6.2.1.2 Modeling using context free grammars, Group and Ring construction
To sum up, given a forest of transactions trees like the one in figure 6.1 below, we
have the following,
•

Consider the set of all symbols representing the nodes in the forest,

•

The direct flow from a node X to a node Y is represented as a monomial XY,

•

The different branches are to be represented as an addition, like XY + XZ,

•

The feedback from a child node to a parent node depending on a condition and the
number of iterations is to be represented as a non-linear monomial multiplied by the
condition.
Considering all the above mentioned points that set of symbol nodes can be
considered a ring under the ordinary addition and multiplication of the ring of real
numbers.

Figure 6.1 Transactions forest
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From figure 6.1 above the following system of non-linear polynomials can be
modeled:
ABE + ABF + ACG + ADH ... (1)
ZI 2J 2 + IKL + IKM

... (2),

assuming we can only have two repetitions in that path. Now the rest of the algorithm can
be completed the normal way by getting Grobner basis for the above system of non-linear
polynomials.

6.2.2 Computations complexity enhancement
Grobner bases and uniform word problem algorithms are essential parts of the
security spectrum algorithm and should perform in an acceptable manner in order for the
whole framework to work in the proper service level. The algorithms used for both of
those problems are the classic Buchberger and uniform word decidability problem
algorithms, which are both NP-complete [34]. Future researchers should try to enhance
those two algorithms, or they may be able to find another way that is not as constructive
as the classic algorithms, but performs better.

6.2.3 Testing
All the results presented in the dissertation obtained from emulating the SCADA
and DNP3 as described in section 4.1. One of the strongest candidates for future research
is to test the approaches presented in this dissertation in real SCADA systems such as the
University of Louisville test bed.
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APPENDIX A
Code
Class KeyGenerator
1* This class uses the crypto java package class KeyGenerator to generate a DES or triple
DES keys and write them into files*1
import javax.crypto. *;
public class KeyGenrator
{
private static final String GPK_FILE_NAME="gpk";
private static final String SPK_FILE_NAME="spk";
public static void main(String[] args)
{
KeyGenrator kG=new KeyGenratorO;
kG.genKeyO;

1* This function generates the keys and calls writeKeyFileO to write the generated key
into a file*1
void genKeyO
{

try {
II Generate a DES key
KeyGenerator keyGen = KeyGenerator.getlnstance("DES ");
SecretKey gpk = keyGen.generateKeyO;
writeKeyFile(gpk,GPK_FILE_NAME);
SecretKey spk =keyGen.generateKeyO;
writeKeyFile(spk,SPK_FILE_NAME);
} catch Uava.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException e)
{
e. printStackTraceO;

1* This function encodes the generated key into bytes and write them into the given file
name*/
void writeKeyFile(SecretKey key,String fileName)
{
byte [] keylnBytes=key.getEncodedO;
try{
OutputStreamWriter oSW=new OutputStreamWriter(new
Fi leOutputStream(fileN arne»;
oSW.write(new String(keyInBytes»;
oSW.closeO;
}

catch (IOException e){
e.printStackTraceO;
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Class StringEncrypter

1* This class does the real job of encryption and decryption of passed message strings. It
is to be used by the Unit class */
import java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException;
import java.security.InvalidKeyException;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.security.spec.KeySpec;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.NoSuchPaddingException;
import javax.crypto.SecretKey;
import javax.crypto.SecretKeyFactory;
import javax.crypto.spec.DESKeySpec;
import javax.crypto.spec.DESedeKeySpec;
import sun.misc.BASE64Decoder;
import sun.misc.BASE64Encoder;
public class StringEncrypter
{

public static final String DESEDE_ENCRYPTION_SCHEME ="DESede";
public static final String DES_ENCRYPTION_SCHEME = "DES";
public static final String DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "This is a fairly
long phrase used to encrypt";
private KeySpec
keySpec;
private SecretKeyFactory
keyFactory;
pri vate Cipher
cipher;
pri vate static final String
UNICODE_FORMAT
=
"UTF8";
public StringEncrypter( String encryptionScheme ) throws EncryptionException
{

this( encryptionScheme, DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_KEY);
/* The constructor takes the encryption scheme which is either DES or triple DES
together with the encryption key, converts the key into bytes, constructs the keySpec,
constructs the key factory and the cipher to be used in the encryption/decryption */
public StringEncrypter( String encryptionScheme, String encryptionKey )
throws EncryptionException
if ( encryptionKey == null )
throw new IllegalArgumentException( "encryption key was
null" );
if ( encryptionKey.trimO.lengthO < 24 )
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"encryption key was less than 24 characters"
);

try
{
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byte[] keyAsBytes = encryptionKey.getBytes(
UNICODE_FORMAT );
if ( encryptionScheme.equals(
DESEDE_ENCR YPTION_SCHEME) )
{
keySpec = new DESedeKeySpec( keyAsBytes );
else if ( encryptionScheme.equals(
DES_ENCRYPTION_SCHEME) )
{

keySpec = new DESKeySpec( keyAsBytes);
else
{
throw new IllegalArgumentException( "Encryption scheme
not supported: "

+
encryption Scheme );
keyFactory =SecretKeyFactory.getlnstance( encryptionS cherne );
Cipher = Cipher.getInstance( encryptionS cherne );
catch (InvalidKeyException e)
{

throw new EncryptionException( e );
catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e)
{

throw new EncryptionException( e );
catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e)
{
throw new EncryptionException( e );
catch (NoSuchPaddingException e)
{

throw new EncryptionException( e );
}
public StringEncrypter( String encryptionScheme, byte[] keyAsBytes )
throws EncryptionException
{

System. out. println("key AsB ytes.length: "+keyAsBytes.length);
if ( keyAsBytes == null )
throw new IllegalArgumentException( "encryption key was null" );
flif (keyAsBytes.length < 24 )
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II
II

throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"encryption key was less than 24 characters" );

try
{
Ilbyte[] keyAsBytes = encryptionKey.getBytes( UNICODE_FORMAT);

if ( encryptionScheme.equals( DESEDE_ENCR YPTION_SCHEME) )
{

keySpec = new DESedeKeySpec( keyAsBytes );
}
else if (encryptionScheme.equals( DES_ENCRYPTION_SCHEME))
{
keySpec = new DESKeySpec( keyAsBytes);
else
{
throw new IllegalArgumentException( "Encryption scheme not supported:
"

+
encryption Scheme );
}

=

keyFactory SecretKeyFactory.getInstance( encryptionScheme );
cipher = Cipher.getInstance( encryptionScheme );
catch (InvalidKeyException e)
{

throw new EncryptionException( e);
catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e)
{

throw new EncryptionException( e );
catch (NoSuchPaddingException e)
{

throw new EncryptionException( e );

1* This method uses the key factory to generate the secret using the given keyspec,
initializes the cipher, and finally uses the base64encooder to encode the cipher text *1
public String encrypt( String unencryptedString ) throws EncryptionException
{

if ( unencryptedString == null II unencryptedString.trimO.lengthO == 0 )
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"unencrypted string was null or empty" );
try
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SecretKey key = keyFactory.generateSecret( keySpec );
cipher.init( Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key);
byte[] cleartext = unencryptedString.getBytes(
UNICODE_FORMAT );
byte[] ciphertext = cipher.doFinal( cleartext );
BASE64Encoder base64encoder = new BASE64EncoderO;
return base64encoder.encode( ciphertext );
catch (Exception e)
{
throw new EncryptionException( e );

/* This method uses the base64decoder to decode the given encrypted string*/
public String decrypt( String encryptedString ) throws EncryptionException
{
if ( encryptedString == null II encryptedString.trimO.lengthO <= 0 )
throw new IllegalArgumentException( "encrypted string
was null or empty" );
try
{
SecretKey key = keyFactory.generateSecret( keySpec );
cipher.init( Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key);
BASE64Decoder base64decoder = new BASE64DecoderO;
byte[] cleartext = base64decoder.decodeBuffer( encryptedString );
byte[] ciphertext = cipher.doFinal( cleartext );
return bytes2String( ciphertext );
catch (Exception e)
{

throw new EncryptionException( e );

/* This is a simple converter function from an array of bytes into a string*/
private static String bytes2String( byte[] bytes)
{
StringBuffer stringBuffer new StringBufferO;
for (int i 0; i < bytes.length; i++)

=

=

{

stringBuffer.append( (char) bytes[i] );
return stringBuffer.toStringO;
public static class EncryptionException extends Exception
{
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public EncryptionException( Throwable t )
{
super( t );

Class KeyDisplayer
/* This class is only for displaying the generated keys */
import javajo.BufferedlnputStream;
import javajo.FileInputStream;
import javajo.IOException;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
public class KeyDisplayer
{
private static final String GPK_FILE_NAME="gpk";
private static final String SPK_FILE_NAME="spk";
public static void main(String[] args)
{

KeyDisplayer kD=new KeyDisplayerO;
kD.display(GPK_FILE_NAME);
kD.display(SPK_FILE_NAME);
void display(String fileName)
{

System.out.println("\n"+fileName);
try{
BufferedlnputStream bIS=new BufferedlnputStream(new
FilelnputStream(fileName));
int byteRead=bIS.readO;
do
{
printB yteAsBitsString( (byte )byteRead);
}
while «byteRead=bIS.readO)!=-l);
catch (IOException e){ e. printStackTraceO;}
void printByteAsBitsString(byte byteRead)
{

for (int i=0;i<8;i++)
if «byteRead & (2Aj)) > 0)
System.ollt.print(" 1");
else
System.ollt.print("O");
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Class Unit (with no security)

/* This is the main visitor class that is to be called from the MTU and the RTU to handle
all the functions of different authentication algorithms - that version of the Unit class
doesn't have any authentication implementation though */
import java.io. *;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Hashtable;
import nsecrec y. S tringEncrypter .Encrypti onException;
public class Unit
{

pri vate FilelnputStream filelnputStream;
private String inMsg, outMsg;
public Unit(String fileName)
{

try
{

fileInputStream=new FilelnputStream(fileNarne);
catch(Exception e)
{
e. printStackTraceO;
}
String getMsgO
{
return outMsg;

void setMsg(String msg)
{
inMsg=msg;
}
void prepareMsgO
{

InputStreamReader isr=new InputStreamReader(filelnputStream);
char []cbuf = new char[lOO];
try
{

int len=isr.read(cbuf);
outMsg=String.copyVa]ueOf( cbuf,O,len);
System. out. println("content of file:" +outMsg);
catch (Exception e)
{

e.printStackTraceO;
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Class MTU (with no security)

1* This class represents the master terminal unit with DNP3 protocol*1
package noSecurity;
import java.io.BufferedWriter;
import java.io.ByteArraylnputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.io.StreamTokenizer;
import java.net.Socket;
import j a va. net. UnknownHostExcepti on;
public class MTU
{
public static int port;
public static int ERROR;
public static String server;
public static Socket socket = null;
public static ByteArraylnputStream input;
public static PrintWriter output;
public static final int MAX_FRAG_SIZE = 300; I/Eventually, change to 2048
public static byte[] MTUfragment = new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; II DNP
Fragment octets to be sent to RTU
public static byte[] fragFromRTU new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; II DNP
Fragment octets for response from RTU.
public static int offset;
public static int length;
public static int byteToBeSent;
public static StreamTokenizer tokenizer;
public static int last;
public static boolean fileWrite_waiCstate = false;
public static long lastModifiedTime;
public static long newModifiedTime;
public static long currentTime;
public static File clientlnputFile = new File ("INPUT.dat");
public static boolean IsUnsolicitedMsgReceived =false;
public static int contentValuel;
public static int contentValue2;
public static int contentValue3;
public static PrintWriter fileContents;
public static File outputFile;
public static long firstS tamp;
public static long secondStamp;
public static long timeDifference;
public static long totalTimeDifference;
public static String fileName "OUTPUT.dat" ;

=

=
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public static BufferedWriter out;
static Unit mtuUnit;
public static void main(String[] args)
{
long time 1=S ystem.currentTimeMillisO;
System.out.println("MTU Timel:"+timel);
server ="10.202.2.67" ; II for socket connections
port=2000;
II use the unit object to do the message preparation
mtuUnit=new Unit("INPUT.DAT");
mtuUnit.prepareMsgO;
connectO; II connect to the RTU
prepareToSendO;
sendArrayO; II Send the message array

1* Initiates a socket connection with the server IPlPort*1
public static void connectO
{

try {
socket = new Socket(server, port);
S ystem.out. println("Port:" +port);
System.out.println("Connected with RTU +
socket.getInetAddressO +
":" + socket.getPortO + "\n");
II

catch (UnknownHostException e) {
S ystem.out.printIn( e);
}

catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println(e);
}

1* Stacks a message fragment into a byte array and transmits it into the server*1
public static void prepareToSendO
{

try {
int offset = 0;
int length = mtuUnit.getMsgO.lengthO;
MTUfragment=mtuUnit.getMsgO.getBytesO;
input = new ByteArrayInputStream(MTUfragment, offset, length);
II get input array and transmit it to server
byteToBeSent = input.readO;
output = new PrintWriter(socket.getOutputStreamO,true);
}

catch (IOException e) {
System. out. println(e);
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}
}
private static void sendArrayO {
while(true) {
II stop if end-of-array
output.println(byteToBeSent);
if(byteToBeSent == -1) break;
byteToBeSent =input.readO;

Class RTU (with no security)
1* This is the class representing the remote terminal unit with DNP3 implemented*1
package noSecurity;
import java.io.BufferedWriter;
import j ava.io.B yteArra yInputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FilelnputStream;
import j ava.io .Fi Ie W ri ter;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.io.StreamTokenizer;
import java.net.ServerSocket;
import java.net.Socket;
import java.net.SocketException;
import java.net.SocketTimeoutException;
public class RTU
{

public static int port;
public static ServerSocket servecsocket;
public static Socket socket;
public static StreamTokenizer tokenizer;
public static final int MAX_FRAG_SIZE = 10000; I/Eventually, change to 2048
public static byte[] fragFromMTU = new byte [MAX_FRAG_SIZE] ;
II Fragment received from MTU
public static byte[] responseFrag =new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE];
I/Fragment to send to MTU
public static File newfile;
public static FilelnputStream outputFile;
public static BufferedWriter out;
public static ByteArraylnputStream ACKtoMTU;
public static PrintWriter outputAsACK;
public static String message;
public static int byteACK;
public static String fileName;
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public static int contentValue;
public static PrintWriter fileContents;
public static PrintWriter unsolicitedOutput;
public static boolean keepListening = true;
public static FileWriter newWriteFile;
static Unit rtuUnit;
static int len==O;
public static void main(String[] args)
{
II The port to listen at for a socket connection
port=2000;
rtuUnit==new Unit("OUTPUT.DAT");
try {
getSocketO; II Sit and listen for any message from MTU
catch (Exception e)
{
S ystem.out. printIn(" Socket Problems ");
System.out. printIn( e);
recei veMTUfragO;
long time2==System.currentTimeMillisO;
System.out.println("RTU time :"+time2);
rtuUnit.setMsg(new String(fragFromMTU,O,len));
II Wait and respond to socket connections
public static void getSocketO
{
try {
servecsocket = new ServerSocket(port);
System.out. println("port:" +port);
System.out.printin("RTU waiting for request on port" +
servecsocket.getLocalPortO + " ..... ");
socket == servecsocket.acceptO;
System.out.println("New connection accepted from: "+
socket.getInetAddressO + ": + socket.getPortO);
}
catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println("Socket Error");
System. out. println( e);
II

}

II Recei ve the message fragment from MTU
public static void receiveMTUfragO II Get the information sent by MTU
{

int byteToBeSent=O;
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initializeArrayO; IICreate an empty fragment to receive MTU octets
prepareStream(); IIStart reading token stream sent by MTU
public static void initializeArrayO IIInitialize the fragment array
{
for (int i = 0; i <fragFromMTU.length; i++) fragFromMTU[iJ
l/initialize array

=OxO;

}

public static void prepareStreamO IIGet info from the stream sent by MTU
{

try {
tokenizer = new StreamTokenizer(
new InputStreamReader( socket. getInputStreamO));
if (tokenizer.nextTokenO == tokenizer.TT_NUMBER) {
fillArrayO; I/Fill the entire fragment array with the info sent by
MTU
}

else {
System.out.println("Nothing to read from MTU in the
socket.\n ");
c1eanUpO;
getSocketO;
}

catch (SocketTimeoutException e) {
System.out.println("\nNo MTU request received in last five
seconds, so");
try {
socket.setSoTimeout(O);
catch (SocketException e2){
System.out.println("Socket Timedout Here");
System.out.println(e2);

catch (SocketException e) {
System.out.println(,,\n"+ e);
System.out.println("Client has closed the connection. RTU will
create new socket. ");
startAgainO;
catch (IOException e) {
System. out. println(e);
}
public static void startAgainO {
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keepListening = false;
IISystem.out.printIn("\n Will clean up and start listening again" );
cleanUpO;
try {
getSocketO; II Sit and listen for any message from MTU
catch (Exception e)
{
System.out.println("Socket Problems");
System.out.println(e);
while (true)
{
receiveMTUfragO; II Get the information sent by MTU
} Ilend while-loop
}

public static void fillArrayO
IIPopulate the fragment array with info from MTU
{

len = 0;
int tokenType=O;
while (tokenizer.nval !=-1)
{
try {
fragPromMTU[len] = (byte)tokenizer.nval;
if (len == 55) {
llLet's get the contents of the file MTU wants us to
create.
contentValue = (int)tokenizer.nval;
}
tokenType=tokenizer.nextTokenO;
len++;
catch (IOException e) II Error reading in nextTokenO
{

System.out.println(e); II Output the error
System.exit(1);
II End the program

public static void cleanUpO IIClose the sockets, etc. or reset variables
{

try {
servecsocket.closeO;
socket.closeO;
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System.out.println("RTU is closing the socket now
=============================");

System.out.println("");
}

catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println("ERROR on IOException");
System.out.println(e);

Class Unit (with Double Secrecy)
1* The visitor implementation of the unit class with the double secrecy implemented.
There will be only two secrets here, ssec1, and ssec2, and two corresponding keys, gpk,
and spk*1
package nsecrecy;
import java.io. *;
import java. util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Hashtable;
import nsecrec y. S tri ngEncrypter.Encrypti onExcepti on;
public class Unit
{

private static final String GPK_FILE_NAME="gpk";
private static final String SPK_FILE_NAME="spk";
private static final String SSECl_FILE_NAME="ssec1 ";
private static final String SSEC2_FILE_NAME="ssec2";
private static String gpkEncKey;
private static String spkEncKey;
private static String ssecl;
pri vate static String ssec2;
II to serve as a delimiter in the final concatenated message
private static String endMark="I/";
II DES or triple DES
private String encryptionScheme =
StringEncrypter.DESEDE_ENCRYPTION_SCHEME;
pri vate StringEncrypter encrypterGPK,encrypterSPK;
pri vate FilelnputStream filelnputStream;
private String inMsg, outMsg;
II The hashtable containing keys and secrets as the double secrecy algorithm
private Hashtable hTable=new HashtableO;
public Unit(String fileName)
{

assignKeysAndSecretsO;
hTable.put(ssecl,spkEncKey+endMark+ssec2);
try
{

filelnputStream=new FilelnputStream(fileNarne);
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catch(Exception e)

{
e. printStackTraceO;

/* Read the secrets from the secret files and the keys and initializes two
stringEncrypter objects one for gpk and another for spk */
private void assignKeysAndSecretsO
{

try
{
InputStreamReader gpkISR=new InputStreamReader(new
FileInputStream( GPK_FILE_N AME»;
InputStreamReader spkISR=new InputStreamReader(new
FileInputStream(SPK_FILE_NAME»;
InputStreamReader ssec lISR=new InputStreamReader(new
FileInputStream(SSEC LFILE_N AME»;
InputStreamReader ssec2ISR=new InputStreamReader(new
FilelnputStream(SSEC2_FILE_NAME»;
char []cbuf = new char[lOOO];
int len=gpkISRread( cbuf);
gpkEncKey=String.copy ValueOf(cbuf,O,len);
len=spkISRread( cbuf);
spkEncKey=String.copy ValueOf(cbuf,O,len);
len=ssec 1ISRread( cbuf);
ssec l=String.copyValueOf(cbuf,O,len);
len=ssec2ISRread( cbuf);
ssec2=String.copy V alueOf( cbuf,O,len);
encrypterGPK = new
StringEncrypter( encryptionScheme,gpkEncKey );
encrypterSPK = new
StringEncrypter( encryptionScheme,spkEncKey );
}

catch (Exception e)
{
e.printStackTraceO;

String getMsgO
{

return outMsg;
void setMsg(String msg)
{
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inMsg=msg;

/* Prepares the message to be sent by concatenating the encrypted ssec 1together
with the encrypted message and the encrypted ssec2, according to the double
secrecy algorithm */
void prepareMsgO
{

InputStreamReader isr=new InputStreamReader(filelnputStream);
char []cbuf = new char[lOOO];
try
{
int len=isr.read(cbuf);
outMsg=String.copyValueOf( cbuf,O,len);
System.out. println("content of file:" +outMsg);
String header=encrypt( ssec 1,encrypterGPK);
String footer=encrypt(ssec2,encrypterSPK);
String body=encrypt( outMsg,encrypterSPK);
outMsg=header+endMark+body+endMark+ footer;
catch (Exception e)
{
e.printStackTraceO;

/*Calling the encrypt function of the stringEncrypter object*/
String encrypt(String content,StringEncrypter encrypter)
{
String ret="Enc Error";
try {
ret= encrypter.encrypt(content);
}
catch (EncryptionException e)
{
e.printStackTraceO;
return ret;
/*Calling the decrypt function of the stringEncrypter object*/
String decrypt(String content,StringEncrypter encrypter)
{

String ret="Dec Error";
try {
ret= encrypter.decrypt(content);
catch (EncryptionException e)
{
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e.printStackTraceO;
return ret;
/* Authenticating the message according to the double secrecy algorithm*/
boolean authenticateMsgO
{

boolean ret=false;
String encHeader=inMsg.substring(O,inMsg.index Of(endMark));
String
temp=inMs g. substring(inMsg.index Of(endMark)+endMark.length 0);
String encBody=temp.substring(O,temp.indexOf(endMark));
String
encFooter=temp.substring(temp.indexOf(endMark)+endMark.lengthO);
String header=decrypt(encHeader,encrypterGPK);
if (hTable.containsKey(header))
{
System.out.println("Passed first test");
String listValue=(String)hTable.get(header);
String spk=listValue.substring(O,listValue.indexOf(endMark));
String
ssec2=listV alue.substring(list Value.indexOf(endMark)+endMark.lengthO);
String footer=decrypt( encFooter,encrypterSPK);
if (footer.equals(ssec2))
{
System.ouLprintln("Passed second test");
ret=true;
String msgContent=decrypt(encBody ,encrypterSPK);
System.ouLprintln("Authenticated and msg content
is: "+msgContent);
else
System.out.println("Ah Oh");
return ret;

Class MTU (with Double Secrecy)
/* Same MTU implementation as above*/
package nsecrecy;
import java.io.BufferedWriter;
import java.io.ByteArraylnputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.io.StreamTokenizer;
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import java.net.Socket;
import java. net. UnknownHostException;
public class MTU
{
public static int port;
public static int ERROR;
public static String server;
public static Socket socket = null;
public static ByteArrayInputStream input;
public static PrintWriter output;
public static final int MAX_FRAG_SIZE = 300; I/Eventually, change to 2048
public static byte[] MTUfragment = new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; II DNP
Fragment octets to be sent to RTU
public static byte[] fragFromRTU = new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; II DNP
Fragment octets for response from RTU.
public static int offset;
public static int length;
public static int byteToBeSent;
public static StreamTokenizer tokenizer;
public static int last;
public static boolean fileWrite_waicstate = false;
public static long lastModifiedTime;
public static long newModifiedTime;
public static long currentTime;
public static File clientlnputFile = new File ("INPUT.dat");
public static boolean IsUnsolicitedMsgReceived = false;
public static int contentValuel;
public static int contentValue2;
public static int contentValue3;
public static PrintWriter fileContents;
public static File outputFile;
public static long firstStamp;
public static long secondS tamp;
public static long timeDifference;
public static long totalTimeDifference;
public static String fileName = "OUTPUT.dat" ;
public static BufferedWriter out;
static Unit mtuUnit;
public static void main(String[] args)
{

server =" 10.202.2.67" ;
port=2000;
mtuUnit=new Unit("INPUTDAT");
mtuUnit.prepareMsgO;
connectO;
long time 1=S ystem.currentTimeMilli sO;
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II

System.out.println("MTU Timel:"+timel);
prepareToSendO;
sendArrayO;
long time2::::System.currentTimeMillis();
System.out. println("Time elapsed is: +( time2-time 1»;
II

public static void connectO
{
try {
socket = new Socket(server, port);
System.out.println("Port: +port);
System.out.println("Connected with RTU +
socket.getInetAddressO +
":" + socket.getPortO + "\n");
II

II

catch (UnknownHostException e) {
System. out. println( e);
}

catch (IOException e) {
System.out. println(e);
}

}
public static void prepareToSendO
{

try {
int offset = 0;
int length = mtuUnit.getMsgO.lengthO;
MTUfragment=mtuUnit.getMsgO.getBytesO;
input = new ByteArraylnputStream(MTUfragment, offset, length);
II get input array and transmit it to server
byteToBeSent = input.readO;
output =new PrintWriter(socket.getOutputStreamO,true);
}

catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println(e);

private static void sendArrayO {
while(true) {
II stop if end-of-array
output. println(byteToBeSent);
if(byteToBeSent == -1) break;
byteToBeSent = input.readO;
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}

Class RTU (with Double Secrecy)
/* The same implementation of RTD as above with the exception of calling the
Unit.authenticateO method to authenticate the other party *1
package nsecrecy;
import java.io.BufferedWriter;
import java.io.ByteArraylnputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FilelnputStream;
import java.io.FileWriter;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.io.StreamTokenizer;
import java.net.ServerSocket;
import java.net.Socket;
import java.net.SocketException;
import java.net.SocketTimeoutException;
public class RTU
{
public static int port;
public static ServerSocket servecsocket;
public static Socket socket;
public static StreamTokenizer tokenizer;
public static final int MAX_FRAG_SIZE = 10000; llEventually, change to 2048
public static byte[] fragFromMTU = new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZEJ; II Fragment
recei ved from MTU
public static byte[] responseFrag = new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; IIFragment to
send to MTU
public static File newfile;
public static FileInputStream outputFile;
public static BufferedWriter out;
public static ByteArraylnputStream ACKtoMTU;
public static PrintWriter outputAsACK;
public static String message;
public static int byteACK;
public static String fileName;
public static int contentValue;
public static PrintWriter fileContents;
public static PrintWriter unsolicitedOutput;
public static boolean keepListening = true;
public static FileWriter newWriteFile;
static Unit rtuUnit;
static int len=O;
public static void main(String[] args)
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port=2000;
rtuUnit=new Unit("OUTPUT.DAT");
try {
getSocketO; II Sit and listen for any message from MTU
catch (Exception e)
{
System.out.println("Socket Problems ");
System. out. println(e);

II

long time 1=S ystem.currentTimeMillisO;
receiveMTUfragO;
rtuUnit.setMsg(new String(fragFromMTU,Q,len));
System.out.println("RTU Timel:"+timel);
II Authenticate the message
if (rtuUnit.authenticateMsg())
{

long time2=System.currentTimeMillisO;
System.out.println("RTU time elapsed:"+(time2-timel));
System.out.println("Msg authenticated at RTU");
else
{

long time2=S ystem.currentTimeMillisO;
System.out.println("RTU time elapsed:"+(time2-timel));
System.out.println("Msg is not authenticated");

public static void getSocketO
{

try {
servecsocket = new ServerSocket(port);
S ystem.out. println("port: +port);
System.out.println("RTU waiting for request on port +
server_socket.getLocalPortO +
socket = servecsocket.acceptO;
System.out.println("New connection accepted from: "+
socket.getlnetAddressO + ":" + socket.getPortO);
II

II

II

••••• " ) ;

}

catch (IOException e) {
S ystem.out. println(" Socket Error");
System.out. println(e);
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public static void receiveMTUfragO II Get the information sent by MTU
{
int byteToBeSent=O;
initializeArrayO; IICreate an empty fragment to receive MTU octets
prepareStreamO; IIStart reading token stream sent by MTU
public static void initializeArrayO IIInitialize the fragment array
{

for (int i
l/initialize array

=0; i <fragFromMTU.length; i++) fragFromMTU[i] = OxO;

}

public static void prepareStreamO IIGet info from the stream sent by MTU
{
try {
tokenizer = new StreamTokenizer(
new InputStreamReader( socket.getInputStreamO));
if (tokenizer.nextTokenO == tokenizer.TT_NUMBER) {
fillArrayO; IlFill the entire fragment array with the info sent by MTU
}

else {
System.out.println("Nothing to read from MTU in the
socket.\n ");
cleanUpO;
getSocketO;

catch (SocketTimeoutException e) {
System.out.println("\nNo MTU request received in last five
seconds , SOli).,
try {
socket. setS 0 Timeout(O);
catch (SocketException e2){
System.out.println("Socket Timedout Here");
System.out.println(e2);
}
catch (SocketException e) {
System.out.println("\n"+ e);
System.out.println("Client has closed the connection. RTU will
create new socket. ");
startAgainO;
}

catch (IOException e) {
System. out. println( e);
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}
public static void startAgainO {
keepListening = false;
IISystem.out.println("\n Will clean up and start listening again" );
cleanUpO;
try {
getSocketO; II Sit and listen for any message from MTU
}

catch (Exception e)
{
System.out.println("Socket Problems");
System.out. println(e);
while (true)
{
receiveMTUfragO; II Get the information sent by MTU
} Ilend while-loop
}

public static void fillArrayO IlPopulate the fragment array with info from MTU
{
len = 0;
int tokenType=O;
while (tokenizer.nval !=-1)
{
try {
fragFromMTU[len] = (byte)tokenizer.nval;
if (len

== 55) {
IlLet's get the contents of the file MTU wants us to

create.
contentValue = (int)tokenizer.nval;
}
tokenType=tokenizer.nextTokenO;
len++;
}
catch (IOException e) II Error reading in nextTokenO
{

System.out.println(e); II Output the error
II End the program
System.exit(1);

public static void cleanUpO IIClose the sockets, etc. or reset variables
{

try {
server_socket.closeO;
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socket.closeO;
System.out.println("RTU is closing the socket now

============================= ");
System.out.println(" ");
catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println("ERROR on IOException");
System.out. println( e);

Class Unit (with N Secrecy)
/* This class represents the visitor implementation of the N-Secrecy authentication
algorithm */
package nsecrecyUpgrade;
import java.io. *;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java. util.Hashtable;
import nsecrecyUpgrade.StringEncrypter.EncryptionException;
public class Unit
{

liThe prefixes of the keys and the secrets' names
private static final String ENCKEY _FlLE_NAME_PRE="enckey";
private static final String SSEC_FILE_NAME_PRE="ssec";
private String[] encKey=new String[5];
private String[] ssec=new String[5];
1* The delimiter for the concatenated string composing the message to be sent */
private static String endMark="//";
/* The number of secrets to be used as the N in the N-secrecy*/
private int securityLevel=2;
private FileInputStream fileInputStream;
private String inMsg, outMsg;
private Hashtable hTable=new HashtableO;
public Unit(String fileName,int securityLevel)
{
this.securityLevel=securityLevel;
setHTableO;
try
{

fileInputStream=new FilelnputStream(fileNarne);
catch(Exception e)
{

e. printStackTraceO;
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1* filling the hashtable like the N-secrecy algorithm*1
private void setHTableO
{
if (securityLevel> 1)
for (int i=O;i<securityLevel;i++)
{
assignKeysAndSecrets(i);
if (i>O)
hTable.put(ssec[i-l],encKey[i]+endMark+ssec[i]);

/* Reading the secret file and the key file with the given index and filling the
enckey and the ssec arrays. This method is called in a loop from setHTableO*/
private void assignKeysAndSecrets(int ndx)
{

try
{
InputStreamReader keyISR=new InputStreamReader(new
FileInputStream(ENCKEY_FILE_NAME_PRE+ndx));
InputStreamReader ssecISR=new InputStreamReader(new
FileInputStream(SSEC_FILE_NAME_PRE+ndx));
char []cbuf = new char[lOOO];
int len=keyISR.read(cbuf);
encKey[ndx]=String.copyValueOf(cbuf,O,len);
len=ssecISR.read( cbuf);
ssec[ndx]=String.copyValueOf(cbuf,O,len);
catch (Exception e)
{
e.printStackTraceO;
}
String getMsgO
{

return outMsg;
void setMsg(String msg)
{
inMsg=msg;
/* Preparing the message to be sent. It has the same logic as the one in the double
secrecy implementation, except for setting up the footer which will be in a loop
depending on the security level in the method setupFooterO below */
void prepareMsgO
{
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InputStreamReader isr=new InputStreamReader(filelnputStream);
char []cbuf = new char[lOOO];
try
{
int len=isr.read(cbuf);
outMsg=String.copyValueOf(cbuf,O,len);
S ystem.out. println(" content of file:" +outMsg);
String header=encrypt(ssec[O],encKey[O]);
String footer=setUpFooterO;
String body=encrypt(outMsg,encKey[securityLevel-l]);
outMsg=header+endMark+body+endMark +footer;
catch (Exception e)
{
e.printStackTraceO;

private String setUpFooterO
{

String footer="";
for (int i=l;i<securityLevel;i++)
{
String temp=encrypt(ssec[i],encKey[i]);
footer=footer+temp+endMark;
return footer;
II Same as the one in the double secrecy
String encrypt(String content,String key)
{

String ret="Enc Error";
String encryptionScheme =
StringEncrypter.DESEDE_ENCRYPTION_SCHEME;
Stri ngEncrypter encrypter;
System.out.println("Key:" +key);
try {
encrypter = new StringEncrypter(encryptionScheme,key );
ret= encrypter.encrypt(content);
catch (EncryptionException e)
{

e.printStackTraceO;
return ret;
II Same as the one in the double secrecy
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String decrypt(String content,String key)
{
String ret="Dec Error";
String encryption Scheme =
StringEncrypter.DESED E_ENCR YPTION_SCHEME;
StringEncrypter encrypter;
try {
encrypter = new StringEncrypter(encryptionScheme,key );
ret= encrypter.decrypt(content);
catch (EncryptionException e)
{
e.printStackTraceO;
return ret;

II Same as the one in the double secrecy except that the tests are being checked in
a loop depending on the security level, to check if the hashtable contains the
ssec[i] secret as a key where i is the secret/key index
boolean authenticateMsgO
{

boolean ret=true;
String aPk="";
String aSsec="";
String encHeader=inMsg.substring(O,inMsg.index Of(endMark»;
String
temp=i nMs g. s ubstring(inMs g. index Of(endMark)+endMark.length 0);
String encBody=temp.substring(O,temp.indexOf(endMark»;
String
encFooter=temp.substring(temp.indexOf(endMark)+endMark.lengthO);
String header=decrypt( encHeader,encKey[O]);
if (hTable.containsKey(header»
{
System.out.println("Passed lookup test no: 1");
String listValue=(String)hTable.get(header);
aPk=list V alue.substring(O,list V alue.indexOf( endMark»;
aSsec=list Value.substring(listValue.index Of(endMark)+endMark.lengthO);
for(int i=O;i<securityLevel-l ;i++)
{

if (i>O)
if (hTable.containsKey(ssec[i])
{

System.out.println("Passed lookup test
no:"+(i+l»;
list V alue=(String)hTable.get( ssec[i]);
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aPk=listValue.substring(O,listValue.indexOf(endMark));
aSsec=list Value.substring(listValue.index Of(endMark)+endMark.lengthO);
}
else return false;
String
aFooter=encFooter. substring( 0 ,encFooter. index Of( endMark»;
encFooter=encFooter. substring(encFooter. index Of(endMark )+endMark.1 ength ());
if « decrypt(aFooter,aPk) ).equals(aSsec))
System.out.println("Passed match test no:"+(i+l));
else
return false;

String msgContent=decrypt(encBody ,aPk);
System.out.println("Authenticated and msg content is:"+msgContent);
return true;
}
Class MTU (with N Secrecy)
1* Same as the MTU implementation for the double secrecy except for the new method
prepareAndSend 0, which is actually preparing the message as the previous
implementation but now we're calling with more than one security level to test out the
functionality and time*1
package nsecrecyUpgrade;
import java.io.BufferedWriter;
import java.io.ByteArraylnputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.io.StreamTokenizer;
import java.net.Socket;
import j ava.net. UnknownHostException;
public class MTU
{
public static int port;
public static int ERROR;
public static String server;
public static Socket socket = null;
public static ByteArraylnputStream input;
public static PrintWriter output;
public static final int MAX_FRAG_SIZE = 300;
I/Eventually, change to 2048
public static byte[] MTUfragment = new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; II DNP
Fragment octets to be sent to RTU.
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public static byte[] fragFromRTU:;: new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; II DNP
Fragment octets for response from RTU
public static int offset;
public static int length;
public static int byteToBeSent;
public static StreamTokenizer tokenizer;
public static int last;
public static boolean fileWrite_waiCstate = false;
public static long lastModifiedTime;
public static long newModifiedTime;
public static long currentTime;
public static File c1ientInputFile :;: new File ("INPUT.dat");
public static boolean IsUnsolicitedMsgReceived = false;
public static int contentValuel;
public static int contentValue2;
public static int contentValue3;
public static PrintWriter fileContents;
public static File outputFile;
public static long firstS tamp;
public static long secondStamp;
public static long timeDifference;
public static long totalTimeDifference;
public static String fileName:;: "OUTPUT.dat" ;
public static BufferedWriter out;
static Unit mtuUnit;
public static void main(String[] args)
{
server :;:" 10.202.2.67" ;
port:;:2000;
connectO;
prepareAndSend("INPUT2.DAT" ,2);
prepareAndSend("INPUT5.DAT" ,5);
prepareAndSend("INPUT3.DAT" ,3);
private static void prepareAndSend(String fileName, int securityLevel)
{

mtuUnit=new Unit(fileName, securityLevel);
mtuUnit.prepareMsgO;
long timel=System.currentTimeMillisO;
prepareToSendO;
sendArrayO;
long time2=S ystem.currentTimeMillisO;
System. out. println("Time elapsed is:" +(time2-timel));
public static void connectO
{
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try {
socket = new Socket(server, port);
S ystem.out. println("Port:" +port);
System.out.println("Connected with RTU " +
socket.getInetAddressO +
":" + socket.getPortO + "\n");
}

catch (UnknownHostException e) {
System.out.println(e);
}
catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println(e);
}
}
public static void prepareToSendO
{

try {
int offset = 0;
int length = mtuUnit.getMsgO.lengthO;
MTUfragment=mtuUnit.getMsgO·getBytesO;
input = new ByteArraylnputStream(MTUfragment, offset, length);
II get input array and transmit it to server
byteToBeSent ::;:: input.readO;
output = new PrintWriter(socket.getOutputStreamO,true);
}

catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println(e);

private static void sendArrayO {
while(true) {
II stop if end-of-array
output. println(byteToBeSent);
if(byteToBeSent == -1) break;
byteToBeSent = input.readO;

}

Class RTU (with N Secrecy)
1* This is the N secrecy implementation for the RTU class. It's the same as the double
secrecy except that that one's main function calls the recieveAndAuthenticateO method
which actually calls the Unit.authenticateO *1
package nsecrecyUpgrade;
import java.io.BufferedWriter;
import java.io.ByteArraylnputStream;
import java.io.File;

95

import java.io.FilelnputStream;
import java.io.FileWriter;
import java.io.IOException;
import j ava.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.io.StreamTokenizer;
import java.net.ServerSocket;
import java.net.Socket;
import java. net. S ocketExcepti on;
import java.net.SocketTimeoutException;
public class RTU
{

public static int port;
public static ServerSocket servecsocket;
public static Socket socket;
public static StreamTokenizer tokenizer;
public static final int MAX_FRAG_SIZE = 10000; I/Eventually, change to 2048
public static byte[] fragFromMTU = new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; II Fragment
recei ved from MTU
public static byte[] responseFrag = new byte[MAX_FRAG_SIZE]; IlFragment to
send to MTU
public static File newfile;
public static FilelnputStream outputFile;
public static BufferedWriter out;
public static ByteArraylnputStream ACKtoMTU;
public static PrintWriter outputAsACK;
public static String message;
public static int byteACK;
public static String fileName;
public static int contentValue;
public static PrintWriter fileContents;
public static PrintWriter unsolicitedOutput;
public static boolean keepListening = true;
public static FileWriter newWriteFile;
static Unit rtuUnit;
static int len=O;
public static void main(String[] args)
{
port=2000;
try {
getSocketO; II Sit and listen for any message from MTU
catch (Exception e)
{
System.out.println("Socket Problems");
S ystem.out. println( e);
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recieveAndAuthenticate("OUTPUT.D AT II ,2);
recieveAndAuthenticate("OUTPUT.DAT" ,5);
recieveAndAuthenticate("OUTPUT.DAT",3);

}
private static void recieveAndAuthenticate(String fileName, int securityLevel)
{

II

rtuUnit=new Unit(fileName,securityLevel);
receiveMTUfragO;
rtuUnit.setMsg(new String(fragFromMTU,O,len));
long time 1=S ystem.currentTimeMillisO;
System.out.println("RTU Time 1: "+time 1);
if (rtuUnit.authenticateMsgO)
{
long time2=System.currentTimeMillisO;
System.out.printlnC"RTU time elapsed:"+(time2-timel));
System.out.println("Msg authenticated at RTU");
else
long time2=System.currentTimeMillisO;
System.out.println("RTU time elapsed:"+Ctime2-timel));
System.out.println("Msg is not authenticated");

public static void getSocketO
{

try {
server_socket = new ServerSocket(port);
System.out.println("port: "+port);
System.out.printIn("RTU waiting for request on port +
servecsocket.getLocalPortO +
socket = servecsocket.acceptO;
System.out.println("New connection accepted from: "+
socket.getlnetAddressO + ":" + socket.getPortO);
}
catch (IOException e) {
S ystem.out. println(" Socket Error");
S ystem.out. println(e);
II

II

••••• " ) ;

public static void receiveMTUfragO II Get the information sent by MTU
{

int byteToBeSent=O;
initializeArrayO; IICreate an empty fragment to receive MTU octets
prepareStreamO; IIStart reading token stream sent by MTU
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public static void initializeArrayO IIInitialize the fragment array
{
for (int i 0; i <fragFromMTU.length; i++) fragFromMTU[i] == OxO;
l/initialize array

=

}

public static void prepareStreamO IIOet info from the stream sent by MTU
{

try {
tokenizer = new StreamTokenizer(
new InputStreamReader(socket.getInputStreamO));
if (tokenizer.nextTokenO == tokenizer.TT_NUMBER) {
fillArrayO; I/Fill the entire fragment array with the info sent by
MTU
else {
System.out.println("Nothing to read from MTU in the
socket.\n ");
cleanUpO;
getSocketO;

catch (SocketTimeoutException e) {
System.out.println("\nNo MTU request received in last five
seconds, SOli);
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

try {
socket.setSoTimeout(O);
catch (SocketException e2){
System.ouLprintln("Socket Timedout Here");
System.ouLprintln(e2);

catch (SocketException e) {
System.out.println("\n"+ e);
System.out.println("Client has closed the connection. RTU will
create new socket. ");
startAgainO;
catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println(e);

public static void startAgainO {
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keepListening = false;
cleanUpO;
try {
getSocketO;

}
catch (Exception e)
{

S ystem.out. println(" Socket Problems ");
System.out.println(e);
while (true)
{
receiveMTUfragO; II Get the information sent by MTU
} Ilend while-loop
public static void fillArrayO IIPopulate the fragment array with info from MTU
{

len = 0;
int tokenType=O;
while (tokenizer. n val! =-1)
{
try {
fragFromMTU[len] = (byte)tokenizer.nval;
if (len == 55) {
IlLet's get the contents of the file MTU wants us to
create.
contentValue = (int)tokenizer.nval;
}

tokenType=tokenizer.nextTokenO;
len++;
catch (IOException e) II Error reading in nextTokenO
{

System.out.println(e); II Output the error
II End the program
System.exit(I);

public static void cleanUpO IIClose the sockets, etc. or reset variables
{
try {
servecsocket.closeO;
socket.closeO;
System.out.println("RTU is closing the socket now
==============================11);

System.out. println(" ");
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catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println("ERROR on IOException");
S ystem.out.println( e);

Class Monomial
package grobner;
public class Monomial
{

float cooficient;
int []powers;
int terrnNo;
public Monomial(float cooficient,int [] powers, int terrnNo)
{

this.cooficient=cooficient;
this.powers=powers;
this.termNo=termNo;

public boolean isGreaterThan(Monomial m)
{
int ndx=O;
while (ndx<terrnNo)
{

}

Class Polynomial
public class Polynomial
{

Monomial [] monomials;
int no=O;
boolean isSorted=false;
public Polynomial(Monomial [] monomials, int no)
{

this.monomials=monomials;
this.no=no;
public MonomialleadMonomialO
{

if (no>O)
{
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if (!isSorted)
{
sortO;
isS orted=true;
}
return monomials[O];
return null;
public static Polynomial sPoly( Polynomial p, Polynomial q)
{

}
pri vate void sortO
{
Monomial m;
for (int i=O;i<no-l;i++)
for (int j=i+ 1;j<no;j++)
if (monomials[j].isGreaterThan(monomials[i]»
{
m=monomials[i] ;
monomials[i]=monomials[j];
monomials [j]=m;

public boolean zeroO
{
return (no==O);

Class System
public class System
{
Polynomial [] polynomials;
int no;
public void System(Polynomial [] polynomials, int no)
{
this.polynomials=polynomials;
this.no=no;
}

public void grobnerO
{

Polynomial [] sPolys=new Polynomial[lO];
Polynomial [] polynomials2Add=new Polynomial[10];
int sPolysLength=O;
int polysLength=O;
for (int i=O;i<no;i++)
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for (int j=O;j<no;j++)
if (i!=j)
{
Polynomial s=Pol ynomial.sPol y(polynomials[i] ,polynomialsU]);
add(sPolys, s);
sPolysLength++;
}
for (int i=O;i<sPolysLength;i++)
if (!(division(sPolys[i]).zeroO)
{

add(polynomials2Add, sPolys[i]);
polysLength++;
}
if (polysLength!::::::O)
{
add (po 1ynomials2Add, pol ysLength);
grobnerO;
}

private void add(Polynomial p)
{
polynomials[no ]::::::p;
no++;
private void add(Polynomial [] polynomials, int no)
{
for (int i::::::O;i<no;i++)
add(polynomials[i));
}
private void add (Polynomial [] polynomials,Polynomial p)
{

}
public Polynomial division(Polynomial p)
{

Polynomial aRet;
return aRet;
}
}
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APPENDIXB
Algebraic Geometry and Computer Algebra concepts
This appendix covers mathematical definitions for concepts used throughout the
dissertation. It starts with defining polynomials, ideals, and varieties, and then defines
Grobner bases. Finally, the security spectrum algorithm is stated using the Grobner bases
terminology.

Polynomials
A polynomial P(X) is defined to be a formal expression of the form:
m
m1
I
P(X) =amX + am_1X - + ... + alX + ao
Where the coefficients ao ... am are elements of a ring R, and X is considered to be a
formal symbol, and sometimes called the polynomial variable.
Two polynomials are considered to be equal if and only if the corresponding coefficients
for each power of X are equal.

Polynomial Ring R[X]
The set of all polynomials with coefficients in the ring R, together with the addition + and
the multiplication mentioned below, forms itself a ring, the polynomial ring over R,
which is denoted by R[X].
Polynomial addition, is simply adding up all corresponding coefficients.
Polynomial multiplication is applying the distributive law by multiplying each term in
one polynomial by the other and adding up all terms.

Ideal
Let R be a ring, with (R, +) the underlying additive group of the ring.
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A subset I of R is called right ideal of R if and only if,
1. (I, +) is a subgroup of (R, +),
2. xr belongs to I for all x in I and all r in R
A subset I of R is called left ideal of R if and only if,
1. (I, +) is a subgroup of (R, +),
2.

rx belongs to I for all x in I and all r in R

A two-sided ideal is a left ideal that is also a right ideal, and is often called an ideal.

Ideal generated by a set
A set X is called the basis of an ideal I if and only if X is a finite subset of I such that any
element in I can be expressed as a linear combination of elements in X. The ideal I is also
called to be generated from the set X in this case.

Varieties
Let k be a closed field and let An be an affine n-space over k. The polynomials f in the
ring k[x\, ... , xn] can be viewed as k-valued functions on An by evaluating f at the points
in An. For each subset S of k[x\, ... , xn], define the set of zeros of S to be the set of points
in An on which the functions in S vanish:
Z(S)={ x belongs to An I f(x)=O for all f belongs to S}.
A subset V of An is called an affine variety if V = Z(S) for some S.

The ideal of a variety
Given a subset V of An, let I(V) be the ideal of all functions vanishing on V,
I(V)={f belongs to k[Xl, ... , Xn

]

I f(x)=O for all x belongs to V}.
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From the above definitions, of the ideal and the varieties, it looks that the ideal and
corresponding variety can actually be used to express the same objects using the ideal
generated by the system of non linear polynomials representing this object in algebra, and
the variety that is the set of all points lying in this intersection area between all those
polynomials in geometry.
Grobner Bases
Grobner basis is a particular kind of generating subset of an ideal I in a polynomial ring
R[X]. It is a finite generating set for an ideal I, characterized by anyone of the following
equivalent properties, stated relative to some monomial order,
1. The ideal given by the leading terms of polynomials in the ideal I is itself generated
by the leading terms of the basis G,
2. The leading term of any polynomial in I is divisible by the leading term of some

polynomial in the basis G,
3. Multivariate division of any polynomial in the polynomial ring R by G gives a unique
remainder,
4. Multivariate division of any polynomial in the ideal I by G give O.

The third property listed above is the one used as a criterion in the security spectrum
algorithm below.
Uniform word problem algorithm,
Let f, PI,P2, .. ·pn belong to R[X], for some ring R, and let I[PI,P2, ... Pn] be the ideal
generated by the polynomials Pl,p2, ... Pn, The uniform word problem is the decidability
problem:
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Does the polynomial f belong to I[Pl,P2, ... Po] or not?
To find the solution to that problem, use the extended Euclidean algorithm and divide f
by Pl,PZ, ... pn , and check if remainder is zero or not. The problem is that this division
does not have a unique solution.
To overcome this challenge, take the ideal I[Pl,PZ, ... Pn] and convert its current basis
[PJ,Pz, ... Pn] into a Grobner basis.
Now, the division can take place and property 3 in the definition of Grobner basis can be
used to reach a solution.

Security Spectrum algorithm using Grobner bases notations
1. Gather the intrinsic conditions of each of the two parties.
2. Gather the physical conditions of the communication between the two parties.
3. Model all these conditions to generate a system of (non linear) polynomials,
{Pl,PZ, ... PnL describing the whole system of communication.
4. This set of polynomials is to be used to generate a Grabner basis for the ideal
I[Pl,PZ, .. ·Pn] in the ring R[X1,XZ, ... X k] where R is the set of real numbers and
Xl ,X2, ... Xk are the modeling symbols.
5. The security spectrum of the two parties is the Grobner basis generated above.
6. Party A generates a linear combination of the polynomials constructing the
spectrum, to be the secret f.
7. Encode the secret, and send to party B.
8. Party B decodes the secret.
9. Party B runs the uniform word problem algorithm; divide the secret polynomial f
by the Grabner basis representing the spectrum, and check if remainder of the
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division is zero or not, to decide uniquely if the secret sent is correlated with the
spectrum.
10. Party B, runs the correlation level algorithm to determine the level of correlation
and decides if this level of correlation authorizes party A. The correlation
algorithm is to be run if the remainder of the Euclidean algorithm is not zero. This
is basically a statistics function that checks out the degree of the resultant
remainder to check out how far it is from the given threshold.
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